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Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory
of Alimony
JOAN WILLIAMS*
Commentators who address the problem of women's and children's
impoverishment upon divorce' generally define their goal as a "new theory
* Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law. This article is
dedicated to my mother, Jeanne Tedesche Williams. Many thanks for the help and com-
ments of my reading group in Washington, D.C., and particularly to Naomi Cahn, Karen
Czapanskiy, Elizabeth Samuels, and Laura Macklin; to Emily Van Tassel; to Jana Singer and
Mitt Regan, whose extensive comments greatly improved the piece; and to Barbara Wood-
house and June Carbone for ongoing conversations that have shaped my thinking. Thanks
also to the American University Law School Research Fund and to Harvard Law School,
which have generously supported my work, and to the following students who have worked
on this: Ashley Barr, Dawn M. Browning, Carrie Cuthbert, Julieann Dimmick, Swata
Gandhi, Terri Gerstein, Jennifer Gundlach, and Janice Simmons. For earlier versions of the
ideas in this essay, see Joan Williams, Women and Property, in A PROPERTY ANTHOLOGY 182
(Richard H. Chused ed., 1993) [hereinafter Women and Property]; Joan Williams, Privatiza-
tion as a Gender Issue, in A FOURTH WAY? PRIVATIZATION, PROPERTY, AND THE EMERGENCE
OF NEW MARKET ECONOMICS (Gregory S. Alexander & Grazna Skapska eds., 1994), and
Joan Williams, Married Women and Property, 1 VA. J. OF SOC. POL'Y & L. 383, 385-96 (1994).
This essay is part of a book-length project entitled RECONSTRUCTING FEMINISM, to be
published by Oxford University Press in 1996.
1. The Displaced Homemakers Network estimates that 57% of displaced homemakers
earn income at or near the poverty line. See NATIONAL DISPLACED HOMEMAKERS NETWORK,
THE MORE THINGS CHANGE ... A STATUS REPORT ON DISPLACED HOMEMAKERS AND
SINGLE PARENTS IN THE 1980s 21 (1990) (documenting breakdown by race and ethnicity),
quoted in Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with
Dolls, Partnership Buyouts, and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67, 69 (1993).
The literature on the impoverishment of women and children upon divorce is extensive.
Studies include TERRY ARENDELL, MOTHERS AND DIVORCE (1986); BARBARA BAKER, FAM-
ILY EQUITY AT ISSUE (1987); LISA J. BRETr ET AL., WOMEN AND CHILDREN BEWARE (1990);
MARTHA FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY 53-75 (1991); Saul Hoffman & John Holmes,
Husbands, Wives and Divorce, in 4 FIVE THOUSAND AMERICAN FAMILIES-PATTERNS OF
ECONOMIC PROGRESS 23 (Greg J. Duncan & James N. Morgan eds., 1976); LESLIE MORGAN,
AFTER MARRIAGE ENDS: ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR MIDLIFE WOMEN (1991); GLORIA
J. STERIN ET AL., DIVORCE AWARDS AND OUTCOMES (1981); LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE
DIVORCE REVOLUTION (1985); Rosalyn B. Bell, Alimony and the Financially Dependent
Spouse in Montgomery County, Maryland, 22 FAM. LEGAL Q. 225 (1988); Randall D. Day &
Stephen J. Bahr, Income Changes Following Divorce and Remarriage, J. DIVORCE, Spring
1986; Thomas J. Espenshade, The Economic Consequences of Divorce, 41 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 615 (1979); Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: How New York's Equitable
Distribution Law Affected Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 619 (1991); James B.
McLindon, Separate But Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Divorce for Women and Children,
21 FAM. LEGAL 0. 351 (1987); Twila L. Perry, No Fault Divorce and Liability Without Fault:
Can Family Law Learn From Torts?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 55 (1991); Barbara R. Rowe & Alice
Mills Morrow, The Economic Consequences of Divorce in Oregon After Ten or More Years of
Marriage, 24 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 463 (1988); Karen Seal, A Decade of No-Fault Divorce:
What It Has Meant for Women in California, 1 FAM. ADVOC. 19 (1979); Charles Welch, III &
Sharon Price-Bonham, A Decade of No-Fault Divorce Revisited: California, Georgia and
Washington, 45 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 411 (1983); Heather Wishik, Economics of Divorce: An
2227
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of alimony. '' 2 This formulation presents several problems, which are dis-
cussed in Section I. I propose an alternative formulation of the issues
behind post-divorce impoverishment. The key problem is not the weak
Exploratory Study, 20 FAM. LEGAL Q. 79 (1986). Weitzman's famous figure is that wives
experience a 73% decline in their standard of living in the year after divorce, while husbands
experience a 43% increase. WEITZMAN, supra at 337-56. Weitzman's conclusions have been
challenged and defended. See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing Financial Interests on
Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 130, 149-52 (Stephen D. Sugarman &
Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990) [hereinafter DIVORCE REFORM] (arguing that, although he
disagrees with Weitzman's conclusion that no-fault divorce has put women in a worse
position after divorce, he believes that women fare poorly under all current regimes); Review
Symposium on Weitzman's DIVORCE REVOLUTION, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 757; Jed H.
Abraham, "The Divorce Revolution" Revisited: A Counter-Revolutionary Critique, 9 N. ILL. U.
L. REV. 251, 296 (1989) ("Weitzman's work is characterized by skewed statistical analyses,
unfounded working assumptions, one-sided presentations of the evidence, and hostility
towards husbands and fathers."); Saul D. Hoffman & Greg J. Duncan, What Are the
Economic Consequences of Divorce?, 25 DEMOGRAPHY 641 (1988); Herbert Jacob, Faulting
No-Fault, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 773 (1986) [hereinafter Jacob, Faulting No-Fault];
Herbert Jacob, Another Look at No-Fault Divorce and Post-Divorce Finances of Women, 23
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95 (1989) (arguing that data on salary and wage income, home owner-
ship, and child support demonstrate that no-fault divorce has had little effect on women's
finances); Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and its
Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 59-77 (1987) (arguing that Weitzman's study does not show
inherent superiority of any set of laws, but that judicial attitudes.that misapply these laws
must be changed and that judicial discretion must be limited); Marygold S. Melli, Construct-
ing a Social Problem: The Post-Divorce Plight of Women and Children, 1986 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 759; Jana Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1103-12
(1989); see also Lynn A. Baker, Promulgating the Marriage Contract, 23 J. L. REF. 217, 230
(1990) (listing additional critiques). As one commentator has noted, "Even those who
criticize Weitzman's figures differ on amount, not on significant disparity in standard of
living between ex-husbands and ex-wives." See Joan M. Krauskopf, Theories of Property
Division ISpousal Support: Searching for Solutions to the Mystery, 23 FAM. LEGAL Q. 253, 271
n.65 (1980) (pointing to inter alia, Weitzman's study as confirming that the economic
consequences of divorce are far worse for homemakers and caregivers than for major income
producers). Unless divorced wives enter another marriage, the economic costs of divorce are
not short-lived. See Pamela J. Smock, The Economic Consequences of Marital Distribution, 30
DEMOGRAPHY 353, 354 (1993).
Women's entry into the work force has not changed their tendency to become impover-
ished upon divorce. See Smock, supra at 366-67 ("Frequently noted trends imply that
women's economic vulnerability might have declined over recent decades, but the results
presented here provide little evidence that women now fare better when marriage ends ....
[M]arket work while married has little, if any effect on economic well-being after mar-
riage.").
Divorce is a major source of poverty in the U.S. The vast majority of female-headed
families result from separation or divorce, SUSAN M. OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE
FAMILY 160 (1989), and such families have replaced the elderly as the type of households
most likely to be poor. See FRANK S. LEVY & RICHARD C. MICHEL, THE ECONOMIC FUTURE
OF AMERICAN FAMILIES: INCOME AND WEALTH TRENDS 4 (1991). See also Mary Ann
Glendon, Family Law: Family Law Reform in the 1980's, 44 LA. L. REV. 1553, 1554 (1984)
[hereinafter Glendon, Family Law] (concluding that the poverty population has become
largely a population of women and children).
2. See Mary E. O'Connell, Alimony After No-Fault: A Practice in Search of a Theory, 23
NEW ENG. L. REV. 437, 438 (1988) ("[Slignificant theoretical work is essential if alimony is
to be 'repackaged' as a logically and politically acceptable doctrine."); Milton C. Regan, Jr.,
Divorce Reform and the Legacy of Gender, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1470 (1992) (book review)
2228
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theoretical foundation of alimony: thinking about the issue in terms of
alimony leaves far too many stones unturned. The key drawback of the
current system goes much deeper, to its underlying decision to place men's
claims in the realm of entitlement, while relegating women's and children's
claims to family law's discretionary redistribution of "the man's income."
The crucial issue concerns the distribution of entitlements. An analysis of
those entitlements uncovers a system of property rules, unchanged since
coverture, that allocates ownership of family wealth to husbands.
In section II, I present an alternative theoretical basis for family claims
upon divorce. The new theory is based, not on weak analogies to commer-
cial partnerships or other strained metaphors,' but upon a description of
gender roles in couples with children. The dominant family ecology, I
argue, sets up an ideal worker with no significant daytime child care
responsibilities, supported by a flow of domestic services from a spouse. To
drop the misleading gender neutrality of this formulation,4 the dominant
family ecology entails an ideal-worker husband supported by a flow of
domestic services from his wife. The flow of domestic services that sup-
ports his ability to perform as a "responsible" "full-time" worker simulta-
neously marginalizes her market participation by precluding her from
performing as an ideal worker.
The ideal-worker's salary therefore reflects the work of two adults: the
ideal-worker's market labor and the marginalized-caregiver's unpaid labor.
The question upon divorce is whether entitlements within the family will
follow entitlements within the market. Of course the husband owns his
wage vis a vis his employer, but this does not determine whether he owns it
vis a vis his family. Traditionally, the husband had sole ownership of the
family wage because of Coverture, which gave him ownership of all family
(noting "a crisis of legitimacy for alimony"); Starnes, supra note 1, at 106-19 (terming new
theory as "the Quest for a Conceptual Basis for Maintenance"); Ann Laquer Estin, Mainte-
nance, Alimony, and the Rehabiliation of Family Care, 71 N.C. L. REV. 721, 741 (1993) ("One
recurring difficulty in contemporary divorce law has been the problem of grounding alimony
and maintenance awards in a coherent theory."). Probably the most influential attempt to
formulate a new theory of alimony is Ira M. Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV.
1 (1989) [hereinafter Ellman, Theory of Alimony]. Other studies that present alternative
approaches include Sally F. Goldfarb, Marital Partnership and the Case for Permanent
Alimony, in ALIMONY: NEW STRATEGIES FOR PURSUIT AND DEFENSE 45 (1988); Sugarman,
supra note 1, at 130; Elizabeth Smith Beninger & Jeanne Wielage Smith, Career Opportunity
Cost: A Factor in Spousal Support Determination, 16 FAM. LEGAL Q. 201 (1982); Margaret
Brinig & June Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage and Divorce, 62 TUL. L. REV. 855,
890-93 (1988); June Carbone, Economics, Feminism and the Reinvention of Alimony: A Reply
to Ira Ellman, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1463 (1990); June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking
Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REV. 953
(1991) [hereinafter Carbone & Brinig, Rethinking Marriage]; Krauskopf, supra note 1, at 253;
O'Connell, supra; Jane Rutherford, Duty in Divorce: Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58
FORDHAM L. REV. 539 (1990); and Carl E. Schneider, Rethinking Alimony: Marital Decisions
and Moral Discourse, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 197.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 129-30.
4. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
1994] 2229
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property.5 The question that faces modern courts is whether to preserve
coverture's allocation or to change it.
I argue that courts should change it, and set forth a concrete proposal
for doing so in Section III. In Part IV, I respond to some possible
objections to my proposal. I first discuss whether the cases involving wives'
claims to husbands' professional degrees, which wives generally have lost,
preclude my proposal. In the course of this discussion, I discuss the
intuitive sense that future income "obviously" is not property. I also
discuss the felt sense that granting family claims would threaten family
intimacy by introducing undue commodification into family life. I then
address the objection that my proposal violates the notion that divorce
should offer a "clean break" in order to allow husbands and wives the
freedom to "get on with their lives." Finally, I examine the potential
objections of various family law commentators, including those who focus
on nontraditional families, sameness feminism, critical race theory, and
men's perspective.
I. THE LIMITATIONS OF THINKING ABOUT POST-DIVORCE
ENTITLEMENTS As THE PROBLEM OF A NEW THEORY OF ALIMONY
Of the commentators who have discussed post-divorce impoverishment,
virtually all formulate the issue as the need for a new theory of alimony. In
this section, I will note several drawbacks of this approach. As Twila Perry
ably argues in this symposium, not only does alimony leave out poor
women; it cuts against all women and children 6 in a number of ways. The
most basic is that formulating the issue of post-divorce entitlements as an
5. Coverture is the legal system that vested virtually all property rights to a couple's assets
in the husband. See CURTIS J. BERGER & JOAN WILLIAMS, OWNERSHIP AND USE (4th ed.
1995) at chapter 5 (husband owned personal property outright; he also had the right to
manage real estate and to the rents and profits therefrom, although he could not sell real
estate the wife had brought into the marriage without her permission). I am not arguing that
the literal provisions of coverture still exist, but that the marital property allocations today
allocate property rights so one-sidedly to the husband that today's system resembles cover-
ture. For an argument that the Married Women's Property Acts, which purported to abolish
coverture, actually perpetuated key elements of it, see Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of
Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127
(1994) [hereinafter Siegel, Modernization of Marital Status Law]. I have been much influ-
enced by Siegel's important work, which came to my attention after I had written earlier
published versions of this essay. See also Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman's
Rights Claims Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994)
[hereinafter Home as Work].
6. Throughout this article, I speak of "women and children" because the gender system I
describe, see text accompanying notes 37-89, affects them similarly. I have not observed the
common convention of referring to the wife as "the contributing spouse" and the husband as
"the benefitted spouse" because that terminology suggests that the patterns of who is
benefitted and who is disadvantaged by the dominant family ecology do not correlate with
the sex of the parties involved. In fact, they do. Id.
[Vol. 82:22272230
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issue of family law leaves men's entitlements defined as "property," while
women's and children's remain in the discretionary realm of family law.7
Twila Perry discusses the first problem with conceptualizing post-divorce
impoverishment as the problem of a new theory of alimony: it overlooks
the interests of poor women8 because they have not traditionally been
awarded alimony.9 In fact, alimony holds out a false hope for most women.
Although one study has found that 81 percent of women assume they will
be able to get alimony if they need it,' ° in reality, few women are awarded
alimony today,11 or ever have been.12 In addition, the amount of alimony
awarded is typically far below what is needed to support anyone, no matter
how modest the person's lifestyle. 3 These statistics confirm Perry's sense
of the limitations of alimony as the solution to post-divorce impoverish-
ment.
Of course, the goal of feminist reformers is to redesign alimony into a
tool that can help women marginalized by motherhood. Yet alimony has
two drawbacks that limit its usefulness. One stems from the way it sepa-
rates the claims of mothers from those of their children. This masks the
fact that wives' dependence generally is a pass-through of the dependence
of their children, as will be discussed below.14 The second drawback is that
alimony carries a variety of unsavory connotations. Said one judge in 1967:
Alimony was never intended to assure a perpetual state of assured
indolence. It should not be allowed to convert a host of physically and
7. A common assumption is that women's liberation necessarily pits the interests of
children against those of women. Note that in the context of post-divorce impoverishment,
both children and their caregivers (who are almost invariably women) are hurt by the current
system's definition of the family wage as the exclusive property of the father. The joint
property proposal would help both groups.
8. Twila Perry, Alimony: Race, Privilege and Dependency in the Search for Theory, 82 GEO.
L.J. 2481, 2484 (1994).
9. See O'Connell, supra note 2, at 443 ("Many men, particularly members of racial
minorities, simply earn too little to pay alimony."); WEITZMAN, supra note 1, at 181-82 ("The
alimony 'myth' is not a myth for upper-middle-class families. But it is a myth for the families
of most divorced men-men who earn less than $20,000 a year.").
10. See Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship is Above Average:
Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 349,
443 (1993) (discussing results of study indicating that couples have more optimistic expecta-
tions for their own marriages than for other couples' marriages).
11. See Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the
Reforms: Feminist Perspectives on Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFORM, supra note 1, at 191, 202
(noting that only about one-sixth of divorced women receive alimony; two-thirds of the
awards are of limited duration).
12. See O'Connell, supra note 2, at 437 (stating that alimony awards "ha[ve] always been
rare"); Baker, supra note 1, at 238 n.71 (same).
13. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-23, NO. 152,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS-CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1985 6 (1989) (mean
amount of alimony received by women was $3,730). Only about one-half of alimony awards
are fully paid. Rhode & Minow, supra note 11, at 202.
14. See text accompanying notes 37-89.
1994] 2231
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mentally competent young women into an army of alimony drones who
neither toil nor spin and become a drain on society and a menace to
themselves.
15
During the no-fault revolution, the traditional hostility to alimony was
reinforced by the "newly institutionalized hostility"16 derived from the
ideal that all adults should be self-reliant.
17
The traditional division of family claims into the three doctrinal boxes of
alimony, child support, and marital property cuts against family claims in
other ways as well. The very existence of the three boxes sets up a "divide
and conquer" dynamic well illustrated by the 1980 Indiana case of In re
McManama.18 In McManama, a wife put her husband through law school
and also did the bulk of the housework. The State Supreme court over-
turned the trial court's award of $3600. The supreme court accepted the
husband's argument that any award over the amount of marital assets must
represent alimony and concluded that the wife was not entitled to alimony
because she could not show need.1 9 Family law's doctrinal boxes enabled
the court to evade giving reasons for its decision to deny the wife any
entitlement.
The most important instance of this "divide and conquer" dynamic is
the strong preference for lump-sum property division, rather than alimony,
on the grounds that a lump sum facilitates a "clean break."
2 As many
commentators have noted, the difficulty is that "for the typical divorcing
couple, no property division rule will make a substantial difference in
economic well-being after divorce"2 because most couples do not have
substantial assets at the time of divorce. The strong preference for a
15. Samuel H. Hofstadter & Shirley R. Levittan, Alimony-A Reformulation, 7 J. FAM. L.
55 (1967) (quoted in WEITZMAN, supra note 1, at 144). See also DESK GUIDE To THE
UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT 86 n.8 (BNA 1974), quoted in O'Connell, supra note
2, at 438 n.7 ("When a woman can work... [she] shouldn't think that once married, she has
an annuity for life.") (quoting Judge William Hogoboom of Los Angeles County).
16. O'Connell, supra note 2, at 442.
17. See Estin, supra note 2, at 722-23, 725-26, 728-38 (recognizing that many courts
attempt to encourage self-reliance by refusing to give caregiver maintenance awards);
O'Connell, supra note 2, at 442 (stating that divorce is viewed as a business partnership in
dissolution, so each partner should not rely on the other); WEITZMAN, supra note 1, at 143-83
(noting that under current law, women are expected to be self-sufficient).
18. 399 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 1980).
19. 399 N.E.2d at 371-72.
20. See MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 39 (1993).
21. See Garrison, supra note 1, at 730. See also Rhode & Minow, supra note 11, at 202
(more than half of divorcing couples have no significant assets to divide); Starnes, supra note
1, at 86-91 (noting that most marital assets are too small to ease financial straits of divorced
women). The fifty/fifty division of marital assets ignores the fact that the mother typically is
the custodial parent. For proposals that custodial mothers receive more than half of marital
assets, see FINEMAN, supra note 1, at 178; Barbara Stark, Burning Down the House: Toward a
Theory of More Equitable Distribution, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1173, 1179 (1988).
[Vol. 82:22272232
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marital property box that typically has few assets allows courts to evade
giving reasons for leaving wives without effective claims on family wealth.
In addition to the "divide and conquer" dynamic set up by family law's
three doctrinal boxes, the design of the boxes themselves presents an
additional problem: both children and their caregivers are excluded from
family wealth by alimony statutes and child support guidelines that define
women's and children's claims in terms of "need. 22 Alimony statutes
typically refer to need explicitly. 3 Current child support guidelines also
exclude children from family wealth. Current guidelines are based on
studies that include only day-to-day expenses associated with child rearing,
and explicitly preclude children from any rights to family savings.24 The
impact of this exclusion becomes clearer after considering what middle
class families typically use accumulated wealth for: college educations and
housing. The effect of cutting children off from financing for college
education is obvious. It is dramatized both by anecdotes we all have
heard-a child having to drop out of an expensive, elite college when her
divorced father refuses to pay the tuition-and by studies showing that the
"fear of falling" out of the professional middle class often materializes for
the children of divorced families.
25
A family's housing is intimately tied to its creation of an environment
suitable for raising children. In the classic scenario, 6 the children of
divorced parents move to an apartment with their mother. 27 This reloca-
22. For critiques of need-based standards, see, e.g., Rutherford, supra note 2, at 570-71;
Patricia A. Cain, In Search of a Normative Principle for Property Division at Divorce, 1 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 249 (1992) (book review); Regan, supra note 2, at 1471. But see FINEMAN, supra
note 1, at 178-80 (asserting that feminists' equality rhetoric masks the needs of women and
children in divorcing families).
23. See Suzanne Reynolds, The Relationship of Property Division and Alimony: The Division
of Property to Address Need, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 831, 831-32 (1988).
24. Thus, child support calculated according to the guidelines excludes the portion of
mortgage payments allocated to repayment of principal, and children lose access to family
savings that in two-parent families are used to cover such expenses as medical emergencies
and college tuition. See Nancy D. Polikoff, Looking for the Policy Choices Within An Economic
Methodology: A Critique of the Income Shares Model, 1986 PRO. WOMEN'S LEGAL DEF. FUND'S
NAT'L CONF. ON THE DEV. OF CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES 27, 33 [hereinafter GUIDELINES];
Karen Czapanskiy, Foreword, in GUIDELINES, supra, at 5, 12. My thanks to Karen Czapanskiy
for bringing this point to my attention, and to Ann Shalleck and Nancy Polikoff for helping
me develop it.
25. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Towards a Revitalization of Family Law, 69 TEX. L.
REV. 245, 268-70 (1990) (citing studies and concluding that "child[ren] of divorce, in some
studies, begi[n] to look much like the old-fashioned bastard, claiming a blood tie to the
father but cut off from the share of paternal affluence that falls to the child of the intact
family unit"). The term "fear of falling" is from BARBARA EHRENREICH, FEAR OF FALLING
(1989).
26. See WEITZMAN, supra note 1, at 30-31 (noting that most homes are now sold so that
the marital property may be divided).
27. One report estimates that "[more than half of women] who ... divorc[e] or separat[e]
lose homeownership and become renters." See NATIONAL DISPLACED HOMEOWNERS NET-
WORK, THE MORE THINGS CHANGE... A STATUS REPORT ON DISPLACED HOMEMAKERS AND
19941 2233
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tion takes the children away from their friends and support network during
a time of acute stress. Moreover, since quality of schools is often tied to
the price of housing,28 cutting the children off from their father's wealth
may affect their long-term future.
Should we have property rules that give children no rights to either form
of family wealth? 29 This is part of the larger question of who owns what
within the family.
This analysis points to the final, and most basic, limitation of a focus on
alimony: it places men's claims to family wealth in the nondiscretionary
realm of entitlement, while women's and children's claims are relegated to
the discretionary realm of family law, where the issue is one of whether
courts will redistribute "the man's income."3 ° Given the American reluc-
tance to redistribute income, this framework places family claims at a
severe disadvantage.
For all these reasons, we need a new theory that supports women's and
children's claims to family wealth upon divorce. It should be framed in
terms of entitlement, not need. It should take into account the family
ecology by which children's dependence is passed through onto women.
31
SINGLE PARENTS IN THE 1980s 30 (1990), quoted in Starnes, supra note 1, at 80 n.52. See also
MARY A. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 94 (1981) [hereinafter
GLENDON, NEW FAMILY/NEW PROPERTY]; Marsha Garrison, The Economics of Divorce,
Changing Rules, Changing Results, in DIVORCE REFORM, supra note 1, at 75, 82, 88.
28. See JONATHAN KoZOL, SAVAGE INEOUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
54-55 (1991) (public education is financed through property taxes; absent an industrial or
commercial tax base, the costlier the homes, the greater the revenue generated to pay for
schools); see also id. at 122-23 (noting difference in funding per student between poorer and
wealthier communities in New York).
29. A number of commentators have answered no to this question, and I agree. For
arguments that marriages involving children should be treated differently than marriages
without children, see Glendon, Family Law, supra note 1, at 1560; J. Thomas Oldham,
Putting Asunder in the 1990s, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1129 (1992); Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed
Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165,
1167, 1169-78, 1182-83 [hereinafter Glendon, Fixed Rules]; OKIN, supra note 1, at 183; Judith
Younger, Light Thoughts and Night Thoughts on the American Family, 76 MINN. L. REV. 891,
900-07 (1992) (proposing a separate legal regime for "marriage for the benefit of minor
children").
30. See Glendon, Fixed Rules, supra note 29, at 1167-68 (contrasting fixed rules in property
law with discretionary standards in family law, and noting that "[f]amily law ... is character-
ized by more discretion than any other field of private law"). For evidence that judges use
their discretion in ways that cut against women's claims, see Starnes, supra note 1, at 92-96.
Other studies addressing the problem of discretion in family law include Glendon, Fixed
Rules, supra note 29, at 1167; Jane Murphy, Eroding the Myth of Discretionary Justice in Family
Law: The Child Support Experiment, 70 N.C. L. REV. 209 (1991). The nine existing gender
bias reports have found widespread gender bias in cases involving divorce. See Lynn Hecht
Schafran, Gender and Justice: Florida and the Nation, 42 FLA. L. REV. 181, 186, 188-94
(1990).
31. See text accompanying notes 37-89. June Carbone has argued that theories supporting
allocation of post-divorce income to wives on the grounds they are entitled to a return on
their investment perpetuate the division of entitlements for children and their caretakers.
See June Carbone, Redefining Family as Community: A Critique of Income Sharing, 31 Hous.
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And it should be part of an overall strategy designed to address the needs
of poorer as well as richer women.32
What we need is a rationale for the just allocation of post-divorce assets
based on a description of gender roles within marriage. The most influen-
tial examples of this approach are advanced by law and economics scholars
who write to justify traditional gender roles, not to bury them.33 Feminists
need to contest their descriptions by offering a vivid picture of contempo-
rary gender roles from a perspective designed to challenge and destabilize
them. 34 The following section begins that process.
II. Is COVERTURE DEAD?
This Part begins by describing the dominant pattern in families with
children: the husband performs as an ideal worker supported by a flow of
L. REV. 359 (1994).
32. See infra note 179 (socializing dependency costs of poor women).
33. Probably the single most influential theory of alimony that draws upon economic
analysis is Ellman, Theory of Alimony, supra note 2; see also Ira M. Ellman, Should the
"Theory of Alimony" Include Nonfinancial Losses and Motivations, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 259
(1991) [hereinafter Ellman, Nonfinancial Losses]. Other economic approaches include GARY
S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 14-37 (1981); ALAN PARKMAN, NO-FAULT DIVORCE:
WHAT WENT WRONG? (1992); Gary S. Becker et al., An Economic Analysis of Marital
Instability, 85 J. POL. ECON. 1141, 1152-53 (1977); Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce and Quasi
Rents: Or, "I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life", 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267 (1987); Elisabeth
M. Landes, Economics of Alimony, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 35 (1978); Sharon M. Oster, A Note on
the Determinants of Alimony, 49 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 81 (1987); H. Elizabeth Peters,
Informational Constraints and Private Contracting, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 437-53 (1986). For an
informative discussion of the differences between various economic theorists, see Milton C.
Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce Obligations and Property Rhetoric, 82 GEO. L.J.
2303, 2320-38 (1994) [hereinafter Regan, Spouses and Strangers]. These scholars justify
traditional roles on the grounds that they are "efficient," see, e.g., BECKER, supra, at 21-39,
and PARKMAN, supra, at 31; or assert that traditional gender roles entail the optimal, see
Ellman, Theory of Alimony, supra note 2, at 49-50, or "economically rational," id. at 46, 58,
allocation of spouses' efforts; or use the language of "incentives" for "behavior society
wishes to encourage," see, e.g., Ellman, Nonfinancial Losses, supra, at 264. The economic
approach to alimony provides the conceptual underpinning for the current draft of the
American Law Institute's Preliminary Draft of the Principles of the Law of Family Dissolu-
tion. See American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution Analysis and
Recommendations (Preliminary Draft No. 4, Sept. 9, 1993) [hereinafter ALl Principles]; Jana
Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered Costs & Benefits of the Economic Justification for
Alimony 82 GEO. L.J. 2423, 2423 n.3 (1994) [hereinafter Singer, Alimony and Efficiency].
34. The most forceful attempts to provide a feminist description of current gender roles
are Starnes, supra note 1, and Rutherford, supra note 2. Rutherford's article was a break-
through in that it replaced the embrace of traditional roles that characterized much of the
existing scholarship, see text accompanying note 37, with a thoughtful critique based on a
description of the current gender. system. As the text indicates, I would frame such a
description somewhat differently. In particular, I would resist characterizing women's claims
as based on "duty," while men's are left in the realm of entitlement. Rutherford's descrip-
tion begins, but does not complete, a description of the power dynamics that reproduce the
marginalization of mothers in generation after generation. Particularly useful elements of
her description are her explanations of why maintenance should not be limited to the
parents of young children, to the unemployed, or to older spouses. Id. at 565-70.
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domestic services from his wife. Mothers typically marginalize their market
participation to supply the childcare and housework that support ideal-
worker status. This dominant family ecology combines with property rules
that define the key component of family wealth-the ability to command a
wage-as the sole property of the worker in the family as well as in the
market. In practice, in families with children, this rule continues to cut
women off from family wealth.
In a sense, then, coverture has been updated rather than abolished.35 At
common law, coverture cut wives off from ownership by formally denying
them the right to own property. Although today ownership is formally
open to all, in practice most wives are cut off from property rights in the
key family asset-the wage of the ideal worker.36
A. THE DOMINANT FAMILY ECOLOGY
3 7
American gender relations are dominated by imagery of equality: the
accepted wisdom is that it used to be "a man's world," but "men and
women are equal now." In fact, our gender system is far more complex,
and uneasily combines traditional gender patterns with a self-description
of equality.
The dominant family ecology has three basic elements: the gendered
structure of wage labor, a gendered sense of the extent to which child care
can be delegated, and gender pressures on men to structure their identities
around work. These elements exist in uneasy combination with the ideol-
ogy of gender equality.
The gendered structure of market work is the crucible in which the
dominant family economy is forged. Employment is designed around an
ideal worker who takes no time off for childbearing and has virtually no
daytime child care responsibilities. The ideal worker is typically away from
home nine to twelve hours a day.38 Consequently, an ideal worker-parent
35. Reva Siegel has reached the same conclusion using different materials. See Siegel,
Home as Work, supra note 5, and Siegel, Modernization of Marital Status Law, supra note 5,
text accompanying notes 229-68.
36. Accord Carol Rose, Rhetoric and Romance: A Comment on Spouses and Strangers, 82
GEo. L.J. 2409, 2413 (1994) ("I think the problem is not that there is too much property talk
in explaining marriage and divorce relationships, but rather too little-far too little.").
37. For other descriptions, see Starnes, supra note 1, at 67-85; Rutherford, supra note 2, at
560-62; Barbara Stark, Divorce Law, Feminism and Psychoanalysis: In Dreams Begin Responsi-
bilities, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1483, 1494-1563 (1991). Mary Ann Glendon has used the term
"family ecology" in a somewhat different way. See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMA-
TION OF FAMILY LAW 306-08 (1989) (referring to surrounding community institutions upon
which families rely for emotional and material sustenance).
38. The average American commutes twenty minutes each way, so a worker working eight
hours a day would typically be away from home slightly less than nine hours. Joan Williams,
Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1597 (1991)
[hereinafter Gender Wars]. For evidence that more and more Americans are working longer
hours, see JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN-THE UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF
[Vol. 82:22272236
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will see his young children for only a few hours each day. For parents with
school-age children, the issues shift: who will pick them up from school,
help with homework, take time off for medical appointments, school plays,
and illness? An ideal worker needs to delegate all, or virtually all, of this
care, in the manner of the traditional father.3 9 Typically he delegates to
the child's mother, who either drops out of the work force to provide this
flow of household services (in the pattern of traditional domesticity, circa
1780-1970), or who remains a market participant, but whose participation
is marginalized by her inability to perform as an ideal worker (the domi-
nant pattern at present).4" The truism that "most mothers now work"
actually ignores the nearly one-third of married mothers with minor chil-
dren who do no market work,41 the roughly one-third of all employed
women who mainly work part-time,42 and the many full-time working
women on the "mommy track.",4 3 When these groups are combined, one
sees clearly that most mothers do not perform as ideal workers. This
gendering of wage labor is the first important element of the dominant
family ecology today.
The second element is the gendered sense of how much child care can
be delegated. "Traditionally," fathers delegated virtually all of child care.
"Traditionally," mothers delegated virtually none.' This difference forms
the background imagery of the current generation, aptly captured in a
LEISURE 5 (1992) ("Contrary to the views of some researchers, the rise of work is not
confined to a few, selective groups, but has affected the great majority of working Ameri-
cans.").
39. This pattern of fatherhood dates to the 19th century. Before that, fathers were much
more involved with childrearing. See MARY FRANCES BERRY, THE POLITICS OF PARENTHOOD
42-64 (1993).
40. Note that the father's delegation to the mother typically leaves the mother with two
choices: she can do the household work herself, or she can delegate it again, typically to
another, lower-status woman. This solution turns a gender problem into a class problem, and
has been a source of considerable hostility to feminism. A growing literature exists on the
relationships between higher-status women and the lower-status women they hire to do
household work. See, e.g., PHYLLIS PALMER, DOMESTICITY AND DIRT: HOUSEWIVES AND
DOMESTIC SERVANTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1920-1945 (1989); Evelyn Nakano Glenn, From
Servitude to Service Work: Historical Continuities in the Racial Division of Paid Labor, 18
SIGNS: JOURNAL OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY (1992); MARY RAMIREZ, MAID IN
AMERICA (1992).
41. See Oldham, supra note 29, at 1108 (citing studies). Nearly one-half of married
mothers with children younger than three do market work. Id.
42. Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 38, at 1600. Many women also work less than
year-round. Oldham, supra note 29, at 1108.
43. For a listing of literature on the "mommy track," see Williams, Gender Wars, supra
note 38, at 242. See also Beninger & Smith, supra note 2, at 203-07 (noting that even when
wives are employed, they tend to restrict their job hours, look for work close to home, and
forego opportunities for advancement in deference to their children's needs and their
husbands' career advancement).
44. For analyses that point to the recent origin of this notion of the "traditional" family,
see STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE 8-14, 23, 25-29 (1992); BERRY, supra
note 39, at 42-101.
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Doonesbury BY GARRY TRUDEAU
RICK, I O4VO YOi.VE O-FF R&L, IT MAY BE iE.CAU/ IM CEO&TXtY YOU FEEL IACR -
A5MJS Aqip0. UCAIFy 5PENPINGA 10OtE, WTMOPE 1SY6Ult7Y1 IU/ILINATUA1Y TRY 70 6ET
DaI/ YOIE.M AS TO,J UP 77M ON FAMILY T14A.,MY FAT Eg FEEL PRET PROUP OFMYEFI Af OMe I.EE'
AOUITIIOT E;la/ ABLE 70 PIP AlP Y01& 9-PI FAR I THINK 7ATh ALL ITREAY BA...
P77MEI7HHIM? LEGS 7METHANY URMOTPIP.. AI&WVOT 70, 1001-f Y00U?
Doonesbury cartoon. The first frame shows Rick and Joanie in bed. She
says: "Rick, I know you love Jeff as much as I do. So why don't you seem as
torn up about not being able to spend time with him?" Second frame:
"Well," Rick answers, "it may be because I'm spending a whole lot more
time on family than my father did, and you're spending far less time than
your mother did." Third frame: "Consequently, you feel incredibly guilty,
while I naturally feel pretty proud of myself. I think that's all it really
amounts to, don't you?" 45 I have called mothers' apprehension about
delegating child care the "domestic nondelegation doctrine.,
46
The structure of work and the sense of many fathers that virtually all
child care is delegable combine with a third element of the current family
ecology: gender pressures on men. Male gender ideology ties men's sense
of themselves, their success as human beings, and even their sexual attrac-
tiveness, to their work performance.47 (This is why feminists traditionally
have used the term "sex/gender system": men have an erotic interest in
perpetuating traditional gender roles.) 4' These gender pressures leave the
45. Doonesbury cartoon, published June 13, 1987.
46. See Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 38, at 1620.
47. See Joseph H. Pleck & Jack Sawyer, Men and Work, in MEN AND MASCULINITY 94
(Joseph H. Pleck & Jack Sawyer eds., 1974) ("Work is the institution that most defines the
majority of adult males. Many of us look to work for our most basic sense of worth."). Pleck
and Sawyer focus on men from the professional middle class. Lillian Rubin finds similar
patterns among working class men. See LILLIAN RUBIN, WORLDS OF PAIN: LIFE IN THE
WORKING-CLASS FAMILY 155 (1976) ("For the men, whose definition of self is so closely tied
to work .... ). The relationship of African-American men to work is complex. On the one
hand, black men may be less likely to identify their work as the chief axis of their identity,
given the history of discrimination against them, see JOHN L. GWALTNEY, DRYLONGSO: A
SELF-PORTRAIT OF BLACK AMERICA 173-74 (1981) ("One very important difference between
white people and black people is that white people think that you are your work .... Now, a
black person has more sense than that because he knows that what I am doing doesn't have
anything to do with what I want to do or what I do when I am doing for myself."). On the
other hand, "successful" black males may well feel a very strong sense of entitlement to
traditional male prerogatives, including the entitlement to a "good" job. Cf. ELLIS COSE,
THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS 73-91 (1993) (detailing career paths of successful blacks).
48. See Gayle Rubin, The Traffic in Women: Notes on the "Political Economy" of Sex, in
TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF WOMEN (Rayna Reiter ed., 1975). Cynthia Starnes and
Isabel Marcus have revived this terminology. Starnes, supra note 1, at 71-85; Isabel Marcus,
HeinOnline -- 82 Geo. L.J. 2238 1993-1994
1994] Is COVERTURE DEAD? 2239
typical man with little emotional alternative but to perform as an ideal
worker to the extent his personality, class, and race enable him to do SO.
4 9
These gender pressures operate differently on men in different class
positions. Men who can achieve positions of prestige and responsibility
tend to structure their identities around their work roles. ("What do you
do?", a conventional cocktail party question among the professional middle
class, is a stark testimonial to the confusion between job description and
personal identity.) High-status jobs typically (if unconsciously) assume a
spouse who is providing more parental care than does the worker him-
self,5" and often assume that the worker's career will take priority over the
claims of other family members, such as being able to move if "the job
requires it."5 Thus, a high-status worker typically needs to command
gender privilege within the household: it is no coincidence that the highest-
status men are the most likely to have wives who do no market work.52
An extreme example occurs in the workaholic culture of Washington,
D.C., where most high-powered jobs necessitate a twelve- or fourteen-
hour workday. This work environment requires that employees have no
children, or have spouses who take care of virtually all child care and
housework. In effect, the work culture requires employees to command a
flow of domestic services from their spouses in order to "qualify" for
high-powered jobs.53
Reflections on the Significance of the Sex/Gender System: Divorce Law Reform in New York, 42
U. MIAMI L. REV. 55 (1987).
49. In the text, I focus on typical people, not unconventional ones. To the extent that a
man defines himself as unconventional, he may experience considerably greater freedom of
movement. Yet "only a tiny minority of us ever are involved in inventing our present, let
alone our future. Ordinary women and men-which means almost all of us-struggle along
with received truths as well as received ways of being and doing." RUBIN, supra note 47, at
160.
50. I base this statement on the assumption that norms of parental care are widespread.
Accord ElIman, Theory of Alimony, supra note 2, at 72. If this is so, then the assumption must
be that a worker who sees his children only a few hours each day and is not available to take
them to medical appointments and to meet other daytime needs is married to a wife who will
do so for him.
51. See Beninger & Smith, supra note 2, at 205; see also S.M. Miller, The Making of a
Confused Middle-Aged Husband, in MEN & MASCULINITY, supra note 47, at 51. ("What
strikes me as the crucial concern, at least for the occupationally striving family, is the male
involvement in work, success, striving. It is the pressure around which the family often gets
molded. Accommodation to it is frequently the measure of being a 'good wife'-moving
when the male's 'future' requires it, regulating activities so that the male is free to concen-
trate on his work or business.").
52. See Harold Benenson, Women's Occupational and Family Achievement in the U.S. Class
System: A Critique of the Dual-Career Family Analysis, 35 BRIT. J. SOC. 19, 28 (1984) (finding
that wives of high-income husbands are half as likely to work outside the home than are
wives of median-income men with (on average) a high-school education; even the most
highly trained wives of privileged men are less likely to do market work than are high-school
educated wives of median-income husbands).
53. For data on the hours worked by lawyers, see Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 38, at
1619. In big-city corporate law firms, "part-time" can mean working from nine to five. Id. On
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Despite these patterns, the ideology of gender equality is strong in
high-status families.54 Thus, the women tend to train for high-status,
traditionally male careers, only to marginalize after the birth of children
because of a confluence of gender pressures that typically involves an
elaborate game of "chicken." The game tracks this typical scenario: Is it
important to you to have a clean house? It's not to me: you clean it if it's
important to you. 55 You think it's important to pick the children up from
school, go to the Halloween parade, be home before 7:00 p.m., spend extra
time with the children during vacations, be a room parent, get involved
with the PTA? I don't. But if you feel you must, then by all means do so.
5 6
Because high-status families can hire people to do most other domestic
work, child care becomes the central issue.57 One study estimated that
American fathers spend an average of only twelve to twenty-four minutes
in solo child care each day.58 Most mothers would "chicken out" in the
face of this definition of how much parental involvement is appropriate.59
workaholism in Washington power circles, see Philip Gailey, A Kinder, More Humane City?,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May-15, 1993, at 2D.
54. See RUBIN, supra note 47, at 96-99 (noting "the philosophy of egalitarianism in the
family that finds its fullest articulation among men and women of this [professional middle]
class"). Rubin stresses that the ideology of gender equality in upper-status families often
accompanies very traditional gender patterns. Id. Arlie Hochschild finds the same patterns,
both of the contrast between verbal adherence to equality rhetoric coexisting with traditional
gender patterns, and of the greater tendency for upper-status families to self-describe in
terms of equality than for lower-status families. See ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT
33-58 (1989).
55. For a description of this part of the game, see Pat Mainardi, The Politics of Housework,
in SISTERHOOD IS POWERFUL 447, 449 (Robin Morgan ed., 1970) ("We have different
standards [of cleanliness], and why would I have to work to your standards .... ). The game
in Mainardi's house appears not to have taken its usual course.
56. For a stunningly honest description of the game of "chicken out" by a male partici-
pant, see S.M. Miller, supra note 51, at 50 ("Overinvolvement with children may operate to
discourage many husbands from fully sharing because they do not accept the ideology of
close attention to children.").
57. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 51, at 46 (acknowledging husbands' "amazing naivete about
the impact of having children").
58. See Grame Russell & Norma Radin, Increased Paternal Participation: The Father's
Perspective, in FATHERHOOD AND FAMILY POLICY 139, 142 (Michael Lamb & Abraham Sagi
eds., 1983) (reporting on studies finding that fathers in typical families average 12 to 24
minutes a day in solo child care). For other studies that report fathers spending more time
on child care, see Nijole Benokraitis, Fathers in the Dual Earner Family, in DIMENSIONS OF
FATHERHOOD 254 (Shirley Hanson & Frederick Bozett eds., 1985); Frances Grossman et al.,
Fathers and Children: Predicting the Quality and Quantity of Fathering, 24 DEV. PSYCHOL. 82,
84 (1988), quoted in Woodhouse, supra note 25, at 284.
59. See Miller, supra note 51, at 50. In fact, both men and women are raised with norms
that assume that not all child care is delegable. However, if "occupationally striving" men,
are forced to choose between those norms and their aspirations to "success," id. at 51, many
will choose to abandon their norms of parental caregiving rather than their definition of
adult success. Arlie Hochschild aptly captures the driving quality of "occupationally striving"
men and their sense that they have no choice but to succeed regardless of the impact on
family life. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 54, at 112 (describing a lawyer whose "sense of self
and of manhood rose and fell with the opinions of his legal community. Loaded as his career
2240 [Vol. 82:2227
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Indeed, most mothers have dropped out: only 27 percent of wives in
families with children worked full-time in 1984.60
The conflict between this highly gendered pattern and the ideology of
equality is mediated through the rhetoric of choice.61 Choice rhetoric is a
useful tool for denying structural patterns such as gender roles: women are
really equal, goes the argument, they just make different choices.62 The
way in which choice rhetoric cuts against women is dramatized in the
divorce courts. Courts often treat husbands and wives as equal actors in
two-career marriages. The husband "chooses" to develop his career,
while the wife "decides" to marginalize hers-both now have to live with
the consequences of their choices. Far from helping women, this distorted
version of "equality" leaves them at a distinct disadvantage.64
was with this meaning for his manhood and self, Seth's career 'told' him what he had to
do."). High-status men typically are raised to feel like less of a man if they are not successful
at work, regardless of how good they are as parents, while women receive the message that
putting their own needs (including their career needs) before their children's needs is
"selfish," and so approach their work with less of a sense of entitlement. These complemen-
tary gender pressures mean that women end up losing the game of chicken.
60. OKIN, supra note 1, at 156. See also BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, SERIES P-23, No. 146, WOMEN IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 7 (1986) ("Many
[women] choose work that will fit around the hours that are convenient to their family
responsibilities ..."). Many mothers who don't quit entirely work part-time. See Martha
Chamallas, Women and Part-Time Work, 64 N.C. L. REV. 709, 714-15 (1986) (stating that the
paradigm of a part-time worker is a mother).
61. See Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 38, at 1594-1632 (examining the rhetoric of
choice in the context of work/family conflict).
62. For an example of choice rhetoric used against a wife's claim for an interest in the
family wage, see Duspiva v. Duspiva, 581 N.Y.S.2d 376, 377 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). The
Duspiva court concluded that the wife was not entitled to recover a portion of the value of
her husband's accounting degree because she did not contribute to his career: "At all times
the plaintiff was the main support of the family and he pursued his studies largely unaided.
The defendant neither sacrificed her career nor assumed a disproportionate share of
household work as a consequence of the plaintiff's studies, and she chose not to work outside
the home for nearly a year while the plaintiff attended college and held down a full-time
job." Id. Note, first, the invisibility of the wife's household labor: are we really ready to
believe that she did not do more than 50% of the household work during the year when she
was at home and her husband was both working and studying full-time? Note, as well, the
court's use of "choice" rhetoric to erase the wife's labor; evidently, if she undertook the
labor with grace, it ceased to exist. See also O'Connell, supra note 2, at 500 (stating that at
divorce a homemaker is told that "she must accept the consequences of her choice and go
on").
63. See Estin, supra note 2, at 743 (arguing that rationales awarding support to caregivers
"seem to receive serious judicial consideration only when combined with the image of an
older, dependent wife"). Estin found that "[flor younger caregivers, the implicit presump-
tion of an ability to be self-supporting is effectively conclusive, overwhelming all other
considerations." Id.
64. Martha Fineman has developed this important point. See FINEMAN, supra note 1, at
20-52. Two separate issues emerge: whether the two-career marriage is a description of
current reality, and whether it is viable as an ideal. Feminists should be able to agree that it
is not the current reality, given the massive amount of sociological data on the marginalizing
impact of marriage upon women. A more divisive issue is whether it should remain the ideal.
Some feminists argue instead for an acceptance of dependence, and a socialization of its
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Thus, in high-status families, gender pressure on men to "succeed" as
ideal workers makes them dependent on domestic services from women.
Typically, high-status fathers' entitlement to continue performing as ideal
workers after the birth of children is never questioned.65 Mothers, despite
having trained for high-status, traditionally male, careers, pick up the
pieces by "choosing" to quit or join the mommy track.6 6
The dynamic in lower-status families is quite different, although it, too,
stems from gender pressures on men and leads ultimately to the economic
marginalization of women. Among men with less access to the most
desirable jobs, the linkage of job status and malehood can produce a sense
of threatened manhood. 67 This affects the gender culture of lower-status
people in several ways. One central effect is to decrease the grip of the
ideology of gender equality.68 In contrast to higher-status men, whose
costs. See Martha Fineman, Illusive Equality: On Weitzman's Divorce Revolution, 1986 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 781, 789 [hereinafter Illusive Equality] (noting that most working women are
not career professionals). Others, myself included, argue for a restructuring of wage labor so
that caregivers (of whatever sex) need not suffer economic marginalization. This debate
needs to be focused, and separated from, the factual issue of whether the dominant pattern
today involves "two-career marriages" or an "ideal worker/marginalized worker" paradigm.
65. Depending on the attitude of the father towards his work, this assumption that he will
continue to perform as an ideal worker can be perceived as an entitlement to continue
something he wants to do or as a duty to continue work he chafes under.
66. For data on wives of high-status men dropping out of the work force, see Benenson,
supra note 52, at 25-28.
67. See, e.g., TIMOTHY BENEKE, MEN ON RAPE: WHAT THEY HAVE TO SAY ABOUT SEXUAL
VIOLENCE 43 (1982). Jay, a twenty-three year old file clerk from San Francisco is quoted as
saying:
These women look so good, and they kiss ass of the men in the three-piece suits
who are big in the corporation, and most of them relate to me like 'Who are you?
Who are you to even look at?'... I'm a file clerk, which makes me feel like a
nebbish, a nerd, like I'm not making it, I'm a failure.
Similarly, RUBIN, supra note 47, at 179, writes:
No surprise either that working-class men often feel forced into an arbitrary
authoritarianism as they seek to uphold their authority in the family and to insist
upon their entitlement to respect. Sadly, probably no one is more aware than they
are that the person who must insist upon respect for his status already has lost it.
That fact alone is enough to account for the seemingly arbitrary and angry demands
they sometimes make upon wives and children. Add to that the fact that, unlike
their professional counterparts, the family is usually the only place where working-
class men have any chance of exercising authority, and their behavior-while often
unpleasant-may no longer seem unreasonable. Those realities of their husbands'
lives also at least partly explain the apparent submissiveness of working-class wives
who, understanding the course of their men's demands, often try to accede to them
in a vain attempt to relieve their husbands' pain and restore their bruised egos.
See also id. at 183-84 ("For the working-class man, [an employed wife] often means yet
another challenge to his already uncertain self-esteem-this time in the only place where he
has been able to make his authority felt: the family.").
68. See RUBIN, supra note 47, at 96-99, 101-02, 183 (contrasting egalitarian ethic of
professional middle-class people with more traditional gender attitudes of working class
people). But see id. 110-11 (noting that working class people also describe their marriages as
2242
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sense of manliness stems from work "success," lower-status men cannot
depend on success at high-status work to establish their sense of potency.
One solution is to stress traditional gender verities about the inherent
differences between men and women.6 9 One study of working class whites
linked the continuation of "traditional" sex roles with the status position
of lower-status men: "unlike their professional counterparts, the family is
usually the only place where working-class men have any chance of exercis-
ing authority."7 The felt need to preserve and enhance the dignity of
lower-status men may well be shared by lower-status women, who may feel
that "a man needs to feel like a man"-especially when his class position
erodes his dignity.71 A high-status woman may well feel freer to challenge
her man with feminist demands; lower-status women (white or black) may
see the same challenge as collaborating in society's belittlement of their
men, and the erosion of their community.72
This dynamic may explain some of the differences in gender style charac-
teristic of higher- and lower-status people. Gender performances that
exaggerate the differences between men and women often serve as mark-
ers of class. 73 Lots of make-up, "big hair", T-shirts rolled up over bulging
muscles, sexy dressing-all are gender performances often contrasted with
egalitarian in some contexts). For another comparison of the more traditional gender
attitudes of lower-status people with the more egalitarian attitudes expressed by higher-
status people, see HOCHSCHILD, supra note 54, at 59-69, 188-93 (stating that working class
tended toward traditional ideal and middle class tended toward egalitarian one).
69. Another solution is to redefine maleness- in terms that men from a lower-status
community can achieve. See ELIJAH ANDERSON, STREETWISE: RACE, CLASS AND CHANGE IN
AN URBAN COMMUNITY 112 (1990) (stating that young African-American men in poor urban
neighborhoods define manhood not in terms of work status, but in terms of sexual prowess
"with babies as evidence").
70. RUBIN, supra note 47, at 179.
71. See ELLEN ISRAEL ROSEN, BITrER CHOICES: BLUE-COLLAR WOMEN IN AND OUT OF
WORK 171 (1987). Rosen quotes one wife as stating:
I think liberation can really ruin a relationship. I mean there are certain things I
would not do to my husband only because it would take away from his manhood, his
pride. Maybe that's why I don't worry about a job as much, because I figure he's
supporting the family; it's his obligation somehow.
Id.; see also RUBIN, supra note 47, at 184 (noting that the wife of a blue-collar man needs
"somehow to shore up her husband's bruised ego"); HOCHSCHILD, supra note 54, at 71
(detailing how a working-class wife "saved Frank's old-fashioned male pride").
72. This dynamic has been best explored by critical race theory. See Kimberle Crenshaw,
Whose Story Is it Anyway?" Feminist and Antiracist Appropriations of Anita Hill, in RACE-ING
JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER 402-40 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992); cf. ROSEN, supra note
71, at 170-71 (noting that blue-collar women's dismissal of white feminists as claiming
class-based privileges that excluded their interests).
73. For the concept of gender as performance, see generally JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER
TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 134-41 (1990). Though sexy dressing
is often associated with lower-status people, this does not mean that they are the only ones
who practice and enjoy it. For an extended consideration of the topic, see Duncan Kennedy,
Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing and the Eroticization of Domination, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1309
(1992).
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a "classy" look that takes a more muted approach to sexual difference.
Accompanying these different norms of gender performance are more
"traditional" roles in the context of work and family. Thus, lower-status
men are less likely to acknowledge equal responsibility for household
work,7 4 and lower-status workers also "choose" their work within the
framework of a highly gendered system of job allocation. The tendency to
conceptualize lower-status jobs in highly gendered terms75 contributes to
women's economic marginalization in two ways. First, lower-status women
are under pressure to "choose" low-paying "women's work" as part of
their effort to construct a persona "feminine" enough to be successful in
the dating and marriage market.76 Second, women who venture out of the
realm of "women's work" into traditionally male, blue-collar jobs often
encounter harassment in work cultures that are masculinized to enhance
workmen's sense of virility.
77
Thus, the gender pressures on lower-status men tend to result in the
maintenance of "traditional" gender attitudes that stress the differences
between men and women. This dynamic both reinforces the traditional
allocation of domestic work and provides the underpinning for a highly
gendered system of job allocation. Lower-status women therefore tend to
"choose" ''women's work" from the beginning-in contrast to the pattern
for high-status women, who train for a traditionally male job and then
marginalize after childbirth.
74. Both Rubin and Hochschild note that lower-status white men are less likely to
acknowledge equal responsibility for household work. See RUBIN, supra note 47, at 102-04;
HOCHSCHILD, supra note 54, at 60-61. Hochschild points out that some white working class
men may actually do more housework than higher-status men but gives no statistics to back
up this claim. Id. at 71-74. Rubin's study suggests that working class men do little housework,
but her study is now very old. RUBIN, supra note 47, at 101. Hochschild implicitly argues that
lower-status black men are less married to traditional gender stereotypes than lower-status
white men. Compare HOCHSCHILD, supra note 54, at 59-74 (describing lower-status white
men) with RUBIN, supra note 47, at 128-41 (description of working class black men). The
relationship of race and class in this context needs to be explored in greater depth.
75. See Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1750, 1801-02, 1836-39 (1990) (arguing that courts describe blue-collar jobs
in highly gendered terms and noting that blue-collar workers themselves enforce the descrip-
tion of their jobs as requiring manliness); Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender,
Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases
Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1079-80 (1992).
76. For discussion of sociological studies on job preferences of younger women, see
Schultz, supra note 75, at 1816-17. These preferences may change over time. Id. at 1817-24.
Women's work is often structured in ways that allow women to marginalize with relatively
little loss: the ten leading occupations of women are ones where it is relatively easy for
workers to leave and reenter. See Ray Marshall & Beth Paulin, Employment and Earnings of
Women: Historical Perspective, in WORKING WOMEN: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE 10, 24 (Karen
Shallcross Koziara et al. eds., 1987).
77. See Schultz, supra note 75, at 1832-39 (discussing harassment of women workers in
jobs traditionally dominated by men).
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These two quite different gender cultures both perpetuate the continua-
tion of traditional gender patterns. Higher-status men need to command
their wives' household work to "succeed" as ideal workers; lower-status
men need to command both household labor and a highly gendered system
of job allocation as a matter of personal dignity. The results are a highly
sex-segregated economy78 and wives who do roughly 80 percent of the
housework.79 Much of the wage gap between men and women is explained
by the combined effects of a sex-segregated economy, women's dispropor-
tionate responsibility for household work, and outright discrimination.' All
these components stem, in whole or in part, from the dominant family ecology.
8 1
This description contests the common assumption that the ideal worker/
marginalized mother pattern is a remnant of the past. The image that
women used to be domestic, but now are full partners in two-career
marriages, is more illusion than reality.82 Instead, the ideal worker/
domestic mother of the 1950s has progressed to today's ideal worker/
marginalized mother paradigm. As noted above, recent studies show that
less than one-third of wives in families with children work full-time.83
Statistics also dramatize the way marriage enhances men's market poten-
tial, while eroding women's: married men make more than single men,
whereas married women earn less than single women.84 Most wives end up
78. See WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK: SEX SEGREGATION ON THE JOB (Barbara F.
Reskin & Heidi I. Hartmann eds., 1986).
79. See Donna H. Berardo et al., A Residue of Tradition: Jobs, Careers, and Spouses' Time
in Housework, 49 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 381, 388 (1987) (discussing statistical study showing
wives contributed 79% of total housework each week); see also DEBORAH RHODE, JUSTICE
AND GENDER 174 (1989) (stating that employed wives do 70% of housework and spend twice
as much time on housework as working husbands).
80. For a recent review of the literature, see generally Jane Friesen, Alternative Economic
Perspectives on the Use of Labor Market Policies to Redress the Gender Gap in Compensation,
82 GEo. L.J. 31 (1993). The question of how much of the wage differential between men and
women can be attributed to the allocation of household burdens is a controversial one.
Commentators argue that a large part of the wage differential between men and women
remains unexplained when they stress the importance of discrimination as a factor in
women's lower pay levels. See, e.g., OKIN, supra note 1, at 148; Oldham, supra note 29, at
1109 (reporting that women with no career interruptions earn only 62% of men's earnings).
Other commentators point to the division of household labor as a (or the) key factor in the
male/female wage differential. See, e.g., Gillian Hadfield, Households At Work: Beyond Labor
Market Policies to Remedy the Gender Gap, 82 GEO. L.J. 89, 91-98, 103 (1993); Ellman, Theory
of Alimony, supra note 2, at 4 n.2 (1989) (stating that most of the difference in the earnings of
married men and women is attributable to women's domestic work).
81. Harassment by blue-collar workers would typically be considered discrimination, see
Schultz, supra note 75, at 1832-39, while "objective" requirements such as long working
hours would not. This difference may well be more apparent than real.
82. For discussion of the development of the "two-career marriage" as an ideal, see Reva
Siegel, Home as Work, supra note 5, at 1191-98.
83. OKIN, supra note 1, at 156.
84. See VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 59-60 (1988).
Married women in their forties earn only eighty-five percent as much as unmarried women;
married men of any age make more than unmarried men. Id.
HeinOnline -- 82 Geo. L.J. 2245 1993-1994
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
earning far less than their husbands. Among married white couples be-
tween the ages of twenty-five and sixty-four, three out of four husbands
earn more than their wives. When both spouses are the same age and have
the same education, the odds against a wife's earnings equaling her hus-
band's are three to one. These statistics provide striking evidence of the
way marriage erodes wives' earning potential and show that most mar-
riages still follow the ideal worker/marginalized mother model.
In conclusion, the design of the ideal worker, the domestic nondelega-
tion principle, and gender pressures on men combine to marginalize
mothers despite the ideology of gender equality. The solution, in the long
term, is to redefine true equality by challenging the current construction of
the "ideal worker." This redefinition involves restructuring wage labor-a
process already well underway, given the growing number of "part-time"
jobs.86 These jobs enable adults to be responsible workers without relying
on a flow of domestic services from marginalized women;87 the remaining
problem is that "part-time"88 work is marginalized within a work structure
that continues to privilege as "ideal" those workers who enjoy a flow of
domestic services from a spouse. Challenging the existing paradigm of the
"ideal worker" would help not only married but also single mothers.89 In
the shorter term, we need to protect women and children from the impover-
ishment associated with both variants of the dominant family ecology. This
85. Id. at 52. A striking exception to this pattern is the African-American community. See
Sam Roberts, Black Women Graduates Outpace Male Counterparts, WASH. POST, Oct. 31,
1994, at A12.
86. In 1993, there were 22.9 million part-time workers. This is an increase from 18.5
million part-time workers in 1983 and 13.3 million in 1973. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATIS-
TICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY; see also Michael Arndt, Part-
Time Jobs At Greatest Risk Under Health-Care Plan, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 7, 1994, at N1 ("Nearly
one of every five American job-holders.., now works part-time, a share that has grown from
one in seven a generation ago thanks to the upsurge in working mothers and the rise of the
service sector."). For articles that advocate restructuring wage labor, see Joan C. Williams,
Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1989); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The
Gender Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Reconstructing the Work-
place, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (1989); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: Restructur-
ing the Workplace, 32 ARIz. L. REV. 431 (1990); Mary Jo Frug, Gearing Job Equality for
Women and Labor Market Hostility for Working Women, 59 B.U. L. REV. 66 (1979).
87. These marginalized women include not only wives, but child-care workers and domes-
tic workers to whom some wives delegate part of "their" childrearing and other domestic
responsibilities. See Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 38, at 1605.
88: See Martha Chamallas, Women and Part-Time Work, 64 N.C. L. REV. 709, 713 (1986)
(defining "part-time" work).
89. If fathers only contribute twelve to twenty-four minutes a day of solo child care, the
situation of married and single mothers does not seem to be that different. Redesigning wage
labor would help fathers, too. Single fathers would be helped in much the same way single
mothers are; they would not have to function in a society that assumed they were supported
by a flow of domestic services they did not have. Married fathers would be benefitted
because they would be able to participate more in childrearing without paying the price in
terms of career success, a price many men feel they cannot pay and still feel manly.
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entails not "a new theory of alimony," but the more sweeping project of
redefining ownership within the family.
A Proviso. It is artificial to talk of one pattern characteristic of all
American families. A wide variety of family arrangements flourish in the
U.S.9° But presumably the default rules should be designed around the
predominant patterns. Today, the default rules allocating the chief family
asset upon divorce assume a two-career marriage in an equal partner-
ship. 91 I have argued that most marriages do not conform to this model;
acting as if they do hurt the interests of divorced women and their
children.
Feminists currently are extremely wary of overgeneralizations about "all
women" because such generalizations have tended to privilege the view-
point of high-status white "essential women." 2 But this fear of essential-
ism, with which I am in full sympathy, should not prevent us from painting
vivid word pictures of predominant sociological patterns. Instead, the
message of anti-essentialism is that designing default rules around predomi-
nant family patterns should be only the first step in any analysis. The next,
90. See Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional Approach to
the Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1640 (1991) (asserting that "[t]he
traditional nuclear family is rapidly becoming an anachronism."); Kris Franklin, Note, "A
Family Like Any Other Family": Alternative Methods of Defining Family Law, 18 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 1027, 1062-64 (1991) (advocating reformulation of the legal definition of
the family to reflect wide range of American families). In important ongoing work, Martha
Fineman has proposed to place at center stage the mother-headed family. See FINEMAN,
supra note 1, at 11-12; Martha Fineman, Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of the Family in
American Law and Society, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 387, 401; Martha Fineman, The Neutered
Mother, U. MIAMI L. REV. 653 (1992). For an extended discussion of lesbian couples, see
Nancy Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs
of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459 (1990). For
a discussion of three-generation families, see Karen Czapanskiy, Grandparents, Parents and
Grandchildren: Actualizing Interdependency in Law, 26 CONN. L. REV. (1994) (forthcoming).
91. Here I refer to the rules that commonly limit alimony to a year or two for "rehabilita-
tion." The assumption underlying these rules is that (in the typical pattern) wives' labor
market participation is not seriously eroded during the marriage, so little so, that the wife
can be made whole in a short period. This assumption reflects not the actual situation of
divorced wives, but the societal commitment to a "two-career marriage" as the paradigm for
women's equality. An underlying point of this paper is that this paradigm, introduced after
the Civil War, see Home as Work, supra note 5, at 1091-98 (discussing ideological changes in
men's and women's marriage roles and their effect on concepts of joint property), should be
reassessed. For documentation on the shift to "transitional" alimony, see WEITZMAN, supra
note 1, at 365-66 (examining role of legal reform in divorce process); Joan Krauskopf,
Maintenance: A Decade of Development, 50 Mo. L. REV. 259, 280, 296 (1985); O'Connell,
supra note 2, at 505-08 (discussing post-1976 North Carolina system of awarding alimony).
92. See generally Elizabeth V. Spelman, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEM OF EXCLUSION IN
FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988) (documenting how feminism has assumed a white, middle-class
"essential" woman, and urging a change). Anti-essentialism challenges feminism to take into
account the differences among women, and argues against generalized descriptions of
women that privilege the viewpoint of white, middle-class "essential" women, treating it as if
it were the viewpoint of all women.
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equally crucial step is to assess how a rule designed around the predomi-
nant patterns will affect a range of diverse families. I begin this process
below, by reconceptualizing how the default rules I propose affect nontradi-
tional families.93
Finally, a word about nonconformity: although not all families conform
to default patterns, these baselines are nevertheless important because
they describe sets of social pressures-here created by an interlocking
meld of gender pressures and (highly gendered) economic "realities."
These pressures and "realities" create force fields that exert influence in
every marriage. They are not irresistible, but resistance requires constant
renegotiation that few couples can sustain over time. To quote Lillian
Rubin: "[o]nly a tiny minority of us ever are involved in inventing our
present, let alone our future. Ordinary women and men-which means
almost all of us-struggle along with received truths as well as received
ways of being and doing."
94
Yet it is important to offer a nuanced picture. To the extent that the
dominant family ecology is driven by gender pressures on men, unconven-
tional men can more easily ignore these pressures than their more tradi-
tional counterparts. In addition, to the extent that the relevant force fields
are created by gender pressures, they can be counter-balanced by other
sources of social power. The example of a high-powered academic whose
husband agrees to give her geographical mobility illustrates one shift in
social power. These exceptions exist, but it is important not to overesti-
mate their importance. Where a wife earns more than her husband, the
impact may reinforce traditional gender roles, as the couple works together
to counter a perceived sense that the husband's manhood is in jeopardy.95
The existence of exceptions should not preclude us from identifying the
dominant trends and designing a default model around them.
B. REDEFINING OWNERSHIP WITHIN THE FAMILY
9 6
"Suppose your wife had done nothing, as would have been the case if
you had supported her, could you, out of your fifteen dollars a week,
93. See infra text accompanying note 296.
94. RUBIN, supra note 47, at 160; see also GLENDON, NEW FAMILY/NEW PROPERTY, supra
note 27, at 65 (stating that marriage partners rely on tacit assumptions rather than negoti-
ated terms).
95. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 54, at 83-88.
96. I am indebted to June Carbone for her thoughtful reactions to an earlier version of
this essay, see Family as Community, supra note 31; her characteristically thorough and
rigorous discussion has helped clarify my own thinking. For early proposals to conceptualize
career assets as property, see Mary Ann Glendon, The New Family and the New Property, 53
TUL. L. REV. 697 (1979); WEITZMAN, supra note 1, at 110-42. My focus is broader than
Weitzman's: hers focuses largely on "career assets" characteristic of members of the
professional middle class, whereas mine addresses the situation of all mothers marginalized
by motherhood.
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have kept your family? If you had paid for the cooking, baking, washing,
ironing, sweeping, dusting, making and mending of clothes, would your
wages have kept you, your wife, and five children as comfortably as you
have lived, and enabled you to lay by a little each year?"
"Certainly not, certainly not; thirty dollars a week would not have done
it."
"Then your wife made the extra fifteen dollars by her hard work and
economy. She came almost as near supporting you as you did supporting
her, did she not?"
97
The impoverishment of women and children upon divorce involves the
interaction of the dominant family ecology with the basic allocation of
economic entitlements through the property system. These two elements
produce an updated version of the common law system of coverture.
Understanding this process requires a reexamination of the relationship
between married women and property.98
The "official story"99 is that married women used to be cut off from
property ownership, but that this exclusion was solved through the Mar-
ried Women's Property Acts (MWPA). °° In fact, this description fits
better with the ideology of gender equality (of which it is a part) than with
social practice. My own work and Reva Siegel's extensive historical analy-
sis shows that the passage of the MWPA did not eliminate the economic
disenfranchisement of married women. Instead, the Acts gave it a new
form.1°1 A capsule history will explain how this transformation occurred.
97. Matilda Hindman, Who Will Support You?, NEW NORTHWEST, Oct. 10, 1878, at 4,
quoted in Siegel, Home as Work, supra note 5, at 1156-57. Note the striking similarity of the
language used in one of the relatively few cases I have found that grants a homemaker an
entitlement based solely on domestic work, Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69, 77 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988), rev'd, 818 P. 2d 538 (Utah 1991):
Here, plaintiff bore the children, was the principal in providing child care and
maintaining the domestic setting, and was also employed part-time for several years
while defendant attended medical school. To hold that plaintiff's only value is the
income she generates ignores the value of her contributions in every other aspect of
family life. The logical conclusion is that motherhood and nurturing of children are
valueless; that preserving and maintaining a home is worthless; and that the
functions of mother, homemaker, and helpmate contribute nothing of value to a
family. We refuse to so limit our definition of support.
98. The argument in this section tracks Joan Williams, Married Women and Property, 1 VA.
J. OF Soc. POL'Y & THE LAW 383, 385-96 (1994) [hereinafter Married Women]. My analysis
has been informed and enriched by Reva Siegel's work. See Siegel, Home as Work, supra note
5, and Modernization of Marital Status Law, supra note 5.
99. The term is Robin West's; she used it to apply to one strain of feminist theory. See
Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 15 (1988).
100. See Williams, Married Women, supra note 98, at 389 (and sources cited therein).
101. See id. at 388-96; Siegel, Home as Work, supra note 5, at 1135-46, 1179-89; Siegel,
Modernization of Marital Status Law, supra note 5, at 34.
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In the largely agrarian era before the 19th century, wealth transmission
from parents to children typically came in the form of land.10 2 With the
shift from agrarian society to wage labor in the 19th century, wages
replaced land as the primary form of family wealth. 103 The MWPA gave
wives the right to the land and assets they brought into the marriage-but
most wives possessed little of value. The earnings statutes gave wives the
right to their earnings-but most wives had few earnings because the
dominant family ecology relegated wives to domestic work." 4
What the MWPA did not grant was the antebellum joint property claim:
the claim that the property of the marriage, jointly produced by the efforts
of husbands and wives, should be owned jointly.1 °5 Wives' claims to partial
ownership of the "family wage" were supported by customs that treated
the husband's pay packet as an asset owned by the family. This understand-
ing was expressed in some locales by husbands' custom of handing over
their pay packets to their wives to use for family expenses.10 6
Nineteenth-century courts and legislatures rejected the antebellum joint
property claim and perpetuated coverture's allocation of ownership to the
husband-an allocation that has continued to this day. The rule that today
allocates ownership to the husband is not even recognized as a principle of
property law. The rule, which I will call the "he who earns it, owns it" rule,
is rarely stated explicitly; an exception is the case of Rasmussen v. Oshkosh
Savings and Loan Association. '0 7 Following the traditional pattern, 10 8 Mr.
Rasmussen handed his paycheck over to his wife, who used the money to
102. This description follows John H. Langbein, The Twentieth Century Revolution on
Family Wealth Transmission, 86 MICH. L. REV. 722, 723 & n.4 (1988) (noting that land was
the dominant form of wealth into the eighteenth century; wealth transmissions centered on
major items of patrimony like family farms or businesses).
103. See id. at 723. Commentators on family law have long noted that the "husband's"
wage is the chief asset in most divorcing families. See, e.g., WEITZMAN, supra note 1, at 387
(advocating "the recognition of career assets and other forms of new property as marital
assets"); MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 234-35 (1989)
(commenting that division of marital property alone cannot be sole means of arranging
spouses' financial affairs after divorce). Note that Weitzman uses the term "career assets" to
refer to pension and retirement benefits as well as enhanced earning capacity.
104. In 1890, only 5% of married women were employed outside the home. LYNN Y.
WEINER, FROM WORKING GIRL To WORKING MOTHER 6 (tbl.2) (1985). This figure hides a
dramatic difference among races. In 1900, 3% of married white women with U.S. parents did
market work, while 41% of African-American women did. Reva Siegel points out that courts
and legislatures protected husbands' property rights in wives' labor through the 19th century
doctrine of marital service. See Siegel, Modernization of Marital Status Law, supra note 5, at
14-15.
105. See Siegel, Home as Work supra note 5, at 1112-79 (discussing joint property
advocacy before and after the Civil War).
106. See Ellen Ross, Survival Networks: Women's Neighborhood Sharing in London Before
World War 1, 15 HIST. WORKSHOP 4 (1983); see also Ellen Ross, "Fierce Questions and
Taunts:" Married Life in Working-Class London, 8 FEMINIST STUD. 575, 580-85 (1982).
Husbands received a small personal allowance for their own discretionary spending.
107. 151 N.W.2d 730 (Wis. 1967).
108. See supra text accompanying note 106.
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run the household; Mrs. Rasmussen also saved some money for their sons'
education, which she placed in bank accounts in trust for each son. Mrs.
Rasmussen died, and the issue facing the court was whether these bank
accounts were properly part of her estate.'0 9 The court held that the salary
belonged to Mr. Rasmussen, absent clear and convincing evidence of a gift
to his wife. 1 ' No such evidence was found, so Mr. Rasmussen was free to
take the money out of the savings accounts and spend it on himself and his
new wife."1
The "he who earns it" rule provides the basic property law framework
for the allocation of family wealth after divorce in both community prop-
erty and equitable distribution states. The key difference between the two
regimes concerns the ownership of assets acquired during the marriage:
such assets are jointly owned in community property states," 2 whereas
many equitable distribution states adhere to the common law "he who
owns it" rule.' 1 3 But most divorcing couples typically own little property
and have spent virtually all the wages acquired during the marriage."' In a
cash-flow society, income streams, not accumulated assets, are the chief
form of wealth." 5 Thus the key issue is not the ownership of assets at the
moment of divorce, but the right to income streams commanded by the
family's adults.116
The exercise of family courts' discretion leaves no doubt that the hus-
band owns "his" '1 17 wage; the only issue is whether a court will use its
discretion to redistribute wealth to his former wife and children. The wife
109. Rasmussen, 151 N.W.2d at 731.
110. Id. at 732-33.
111. Id. at 733-34.
112. JUDITH AREEN, FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIAL 716 (3d ed. 1992) (discussing
property division in community property states). This includes wages earned during the
marriage; each spouse owns fifty percent. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 296 (2d ed. 1988).
113. IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 232-33 (2d ed.
1991) [hereinafter ELLMAN, FAMILY LAW] (explaining that the underlying premise of equi-
table distribution courts is that "property is owned by the spouse who earned it"). Ellman
notes that some states have moved to a formal presumption of equal division, but that in
practice wives in such states often receive less than 50% of marital assets. Id. at 233. The
hidden and unstated "he who earns it" rule appears to guide many courts' use of their
discretion in "presumption of equal division" states. Id. (citing study reporting that wives
received, on average, only 30% of marital assets in degree cases).
114. See supra text accompanying note 21.
115. Langbein, supra note 102, at 723.
116. Commentators have long recognized this. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 112.
117. I put this in quotes to point out that it constitutes a conclusion of law (one I am
challenging). The husband's wage is clearly "his" in relation to his employer, but it does not
follow that it is "his" in relation to his family. Courts' assumption that the wage belongs to
the husband is a continuation of the now-outdated approach of allocating property upon
divorce to the person who holds legal title. See Stewart E. Sterk, Restraint on Alienation of
Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV. 383, 432 (1993) (detailing courts' refusal to recognize human
capital as property in a variety of situations).
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and children are viewed as having no independent entitlement; typically
they are entitled only to the amount they "need" for their on-going
support. 18 Most states' child support guidelines do not grant children an
entitlement to a share of their fathers' income, but instead give them a
smaller amount that rigorously excludes ownership of family wealth.
119
Wives' lack of entitlement is dramatized by the cases in which a wife
earning $12,000 to $15,000 a year is barred from alimony on the grounds
that she cannot show need, even though her former husband earns over
$100,000 a year as a professional.
120
Awards of both child support and alimony thus reflect the underlying
property law assumption that "he who earns it, owns it." This assumption is
so strong that typically it is not overcome even by explicit statutory lan-
guage allowing courts to give wives entitlements that reflect their domestic
contributions. 121
My description of the dominant family ecology illustrates that wives'
labor is an integral part of the dynamic that produced the husband's
ideal-worker status. 122 Courts and commentators, moreover, have noted
that the primary value of a full- or part-time homemaker is that her
domestic work allows her husband to concentrate his efforts on market
work.123 Single fathers, who lack the flow of domestic services that typically
118. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. Although an "equal standard of living"
approach is available for use in setting the guidelines required under the Child Support
Enforcement Amendments of 1984 and the Family Support Act of 1988, no state has yet
adopted this approach. Rhode & Minow, supra note 11, at 205-06. This may well reflect the
implicit understanding that "he who earns it, owns it." Obviously, the equal standard of
living approach is the approach most consonant with the understanding of family entitle-
ments encapsulated in the income-sharing proposal presented below.
119. See supra text accompanying note 24.
120. See, e.g., Luedke v. Luedke, 487 N.E.2d 133 (Ind. 1985) (awarding less than half of
the marital property to the homemaker after nineteen years of marriage; wife could earn
$12,000 annually, while husband's income was roughly $100,000); Rohling v. Rohling, 379
N.W.2d 519, 524 (Minn. 1986) (refusing to award permanent maintenance to sixty-year old
homemaker, married twenty-eight years, with an eighth-grade education); Napier v. Napier,
374 N.W.2d 512 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (granting temporary maintenance to a homemaker
married nineteen years, who earned $6 per hour compared to husband's $53,000 per year).
121. See Starnes, supra note 1, at 95 (stating that courts have adopted a posture unfavor-
able to homemakers in construing language requiring them to "consider" several UMDA-
style factors, including contribution of a spouse as a homemaker); see also Estin, supra note
2, at 748 n.93, 749-50 (concluding that, although both versions of UMDA property division
provisions direct courts to consider "contribution of spouse as a homemaker," only a few
appellate courts have so construed the provisions; many state statutes allowing or requiring
homemaking to be considered in setting alimony either are ignored or are used only to
bolster the claims of older homemakers). For an example of such states, see OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3801 (c)(1)(m) (Anderson Supp. 1990) ("lost income production capacity of
either party that resulted from that party's marital responsibilities"), and other statutes cited
in ESTIN, supra note 2, at 100-02.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 37-89.
123. Beninger & Smith, supra note 2, at 203; Carol S. Bruch, Property Rights of De Facto
Spouses Including Thoughts on the Value of Homemakers' Services, 10 FAM. LEGAL Q. 101,
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supports married fathers, often have to cut back on work commitments
because of their caretaking roles. A 1983 survey found that nearly a third
of the single fathers polled had to reduce their work-related travel, a third
had to arrive late or leave early, and roughly 10 percent had quit or been
fired because of work/family conflicts. 124 These statistics suggest that, in
the typical marriage, where most homemaking devolves upon the wife,
"she came almost as near supporting [him] as [he] did supporting her
,,125
As a result of these arrangements and legal principles, coverture has
been updated rather than abolished. Now that married women have the
legal right to own tangible assets, such assets no longer constitute the chief
component of family wealth. Instead, the key component-the income
stream commanded by the ideal worker-is governed by a legal rule that
effectively places ownership in the husband. Married women's current
impoverishment is as much a product of law as it was under coverture. In
each case, ownership of the chief family asset-tangible property in the
past; the family wage today-lies with the husband.
Once the problem is articulated in this way, the solution becomes clear.
Because the impoverishment of women and children upon divorce results
from the allocation of property rights, an effective solution will require a
redesign of property entitlements. 126 In the following section, I undertake
that redesign.
III. PROPERTY POST-COVERTURE: A JOINT PROPERTY PROPOSAL
Many commentators have endorsed proposals to equalize the income of
the two post-divorce households,'27 but such proposals have never been
110-14 (1974); B.F. Kiker, Divorce Litigation: Valuing the Spouses' Contributions to the
Marriage, 16 TRIAL 48, 48 (Dec. 1980); see also Goldfarb, supra note 2, at 49 n.59 (citing cases
in which husband's career is enhanced when wife assumes daily responsibility for home and family).
124. Goldfarb, supra note 2, at 48-49 (citing Glenn Collins, Single-Father Survey Finds
Adjustment a Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1983, at B17).
125. See supra text accompanying note 97.
126. Any solution that addresses the problem of wives' and children's impoverishment
exclusively through family law threatens to perpetuate the problem of allocating men's
entitlements to the nondiscretionary realm of property law, while leaving women's and
children's in the discretionary realm of family law.
127. See OKIN, supra note 1, at 179, 183; REGAN, supra note 20, at 148 (proposing
equalization of post-divorce household incomes based on length of time parties were
married); WEITZMAN, supra note 1, at 272-76 (arguing that income-sharing approach to child
support is fair because it does not significantly reduce standard of living); Goldfarb, supra
note 2, at 50-53; O'Connell, supra note 2, at 506 (endorsing income equalization); Regan,
Spouses and Strangers, supra note 33, at 2387; Rhode & Minow, supra note 11, at 201 (arguing
that spouses should have a right to a percentage of each other's previous and future earning
potential according to their contribution to the relationship and their incidental loss in
personal earning potential); Rutherford, supra note 2, at 578-79 (suggesting that we should
adopt income sharing on the basis that spouses expect to share income when they are
married); Singer, supra note 1, at 1117-18.
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placed on a firm theoretical basis.128 Often they rest on strained analogies
to commercial partnership law129 or vague discussions of "duty. ' 130 My
discussion of the dominant family ecology provides an alternative: income-
equalization emerges as a way to design family entitlements to reflect the
general sociological patterns reflected in the dominant family ecology.
In this section, I first critique Ira Ellman's influential proposal to sharply
limit wives' claims upon post-divorce income. I then discuss an alternative
approach.
A. ELLMAN'S "THEORY OF ALIMONY"
[Tihe marriage has not continued; why then should [the wife] continue
to share in her former husband's income?
Ira Ellman1
3 1
Ellman's response to this question is to give wives a claim to the former
husband's income only to the extent they can prove that their human
capital has been undermined subsequent to marriage. 132 His proposal,
which has proved very influential, has been aptly criticized by others. 133 My
analysis adds several points.
First, Ellman's proposal limits recovery to a narrow range of situations
that fail to encompass the needs of many divorced mothers. It is designed
128. See Carbone & Brinig, Rethinking Marriage, supra note 2, at 1002-03 (noting that Jana
Singer's income sharing proposal rests on unarticulated notions of entitlement); Oldham,
supra note 29, at 1110-11 (arguing that the rationale for Deborah Rhode and Martha
Minow's proposal to equalize standard of living is unclear and is not justified by focus on
career damage); Sugarman, supra note 1, at 149-53, 152 ("Although Weitzman does not, as I
see it, really try to argue for the equal living standards norm, at several places she seems to
endorse it. Just what is the case for it? I am still trying to figure that out.").
129. See Singer, supra note 1, at 1114-17; Goldfarb, supra note 2, at 48 (proposing
investment partnership theory of marriage that treats both spouses as equal investors
entitled to equal share of benefits). But see Bea Ann Smith, The Partnership Theory of
Marriage: A Borrowed Solution Fails, 68 TEX. L. REV. 689 (1990); Ellman, Theory of Alimony,
supra note 2, at 33-40 (discussing limitations of partnership model); O'Connell, supra note 2,
at 496-98 ("The defects in the partnership model ... have been the subject of extensive
commentary during the past few decades.")
130. See Rutherford, supra note 2, at 543, 559-75 (arguing that mutual duty to share
income arises from marital division of labor).
131. ElIman, Nonfinancial Losses, supra note 33, at 274.
132. See id. at 273 ("We wish to measure only the financial loss the claimant incurred from
her marital sharing behavior .... [W]e ask what earning capacity she would have but for this
sacrifice.").
133. See Alimony and Efficiency, supra note 33, at 2431; Family as Community, supra note
31, at 28-30; June Carbone, Economics, Feminism, and the Reinvention of Alimony: A Reply to
Ira Ellman, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1463, 1497-98 (1990) (supporting Ellman's advocacy of
"restitution" damages, but criticizing the narrowness of his "best earning potential" test);
Schneider, supra note 2, at 198 (questioning the validity of "any attempt to base a theory of
alimony on morally 'neutral' terms"). For Ellman's reply to Schneider, see Ellman,
Nonfinancial Losses, supra note 33.
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around the family ecology typical of higher-status families, in which wives
train for careers and then disinvest after marriage. 13 4 Ellman's model
helps a small group of relatively affluent women, 135 but ignores the claims
of the large majority of less privileged women1 36 for whom disinvestment
occurs before marriage as part of basic gender training. 37
Ellman's exclusive focus on reimbursing the wife for losses in her earn-
ing capacity"' presents two separate problems. First, his model for measur-
ing a wife's losses omits the losses typically experienced by lower-status
wives. A service-sector or pink-collar worker does not suffer the same
direct decrease in earnings as the attorney who leaves the partnership
track, but she may well lose opportunities and other employment benefits.
Sociological studies show that working-class women who start out in "wom-
en's work" often respond to attractive job opportunities; thus, a wife who
started out as a clerical worker might have ended up a machinist.
139
Moreover, even working-class wives who reenter the workforce after di-
vorce doing the same job they did before may have sacrificed subtler
benefits. For example, informal seniority and flexibility often are granted
to valued, long-term workers; these informal benefits can prove extremely
important for a mother with a sick child or other crisis.1 4 °
Ellman's exclusive focus on detriment to the wife also presents a deeper
problem: it ignores the benefits conferred upon husbands by the dominant
family ecology. A wife who shoulders childrearing and other domestic
responsibilities allows her husband both to perform as an ideal worker and
134. Ellman, Theory of Alimony, supra note 2, at 42, 55. For an argument that the
"demanding requirements" characteristic of many high status careers both assume and
reinforce a gender hierarchy, see Joan C. Williams, Sameness Feminism and the Work/Family
Conflict, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 347, 352-54 (1990).
135. Most of the examples Ellman uses are of professional women. See, e.g., Ellman,
Theory of Alimony, supra note 2, at 58-60, 71-73 (using examples of wives employed as
teachers and lawyers in order to describe wives' marital investment). Only 7.2% of American
workers ages 25 and older have degrees beyond a bachelor's degree. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS SOCIETAL & ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS
tbl. 31 CP-2-1 (1990).
136. Half of all working women are employed in "women's work," working in occupations
that are at least eighty percent female. These occupations include such traditional female
employment as secretaries, nurses, librarians, and child care workers. See WOMEN'S WORK,
MEN'S WORK, supra note 78, at 7. Almost three quarters of working men, 71%, are employed
in "men's work," working in occupations that are at least 80% male. Men's occupations
include such careers as engineers, chemists, physicians, and carpenters. See id. at 20; Martha
L. Fineman, Illusive Equality: On Weitzman's Divorce Revolution, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
781, 789 ("The majority of married women, even if they are mothers, now work. Most of
these women ... do not have 'careers'; they have 'jobs'-hard, low-paying, and essentially
dead-end jobs.").
137. See supra text accompanying notes 73-78.
138. ElIman, Theory ofAlimony, supra note 2, at 40-48.
139. See Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work, supra note 75, at 1829-31.
140. Cf. PARKMAN, supra note 33, at 141-42 (arguing that retail sales clerk would not be
made worse off by divorce compared with position she would occupy with marriage and
without withdrawal from labor force).
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to have his children raised according to norms of parental care that Ellman
himself explicitly embraces.14" ' Husbands receive this benefit regardless of
whether or not the wife has received the kind of detriment Ellman is
willing to recognize.
14 2
Ellman, like other commentators, 143 also overlooks the important fact
that divorcing fathers retain the primary benefit they garner from the domestic
ecology even after the marriage has ended.'44 In the 90 percent of divorces in
which mothers are awarded sole physical and legal custody-and even in
states such as California where joint custody is favored-mothers typically
remain the children's primary caretaker. 45 Thus, even after divorce, non-
custodial fathers continue to receive the benefits of the dominant family
ecology: they can continue to perform as ideal workers while their children
are raised according to norms of parental care. Divorced fathers still are
supported by a flow of domestic services from their ex-wives: if they were
not, they also would have to "choose" a job that allowed them to stay
home with a baby, to pick their children up from school, take time off
when the children are sick, or to otherwise provide care (or partially
delegate it, at considerable expense) in the ways their ex-wives 
do.1 46
Husbands' continuing financial obligations reflect the continuing depen-
dence of their children and the continuing caretaking obligations of their
141. See Eliman, Theory of Alimony, supra note 2, at 72 (arguing that parental care is
valued in American culture as a "traditional ideal"). By referring to these norms as
"accepted," I am not necessarily endorsing them wholeheartedly. Certainly, it is inappropri-
ate for children to have two parents working twelve-hour days; yet the relatively recent ideal
that one parent should attend to children full-time needs to be reassessed. See BERRY, supra
note 39, at 42-84.
142. Accord Carbone, Family as Community, supra note 31, at 375. In the typical house-
hold, these benefits include not only increased earning capacity, but more leisure. See
Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 38, at 1599 n.223 (stating that husbands of working wives
enjoy more leisure and have more time to eat and sleep than their wives). Some courts have
recognized the way wives' efforts confer benefits upon husbands. See, e.g., In Re Marriage of
LaRocque, 406 N.W.2d 736, 742 (Wis. 1987) ("The record is replete with evidence of Mrs.
LaRocque's contributions to Mr. LaRocque's education and increased earning power.").
143. See Starnes, supra note 1, at 86-91. Human capital theorists all ignore the on-going
benefits to the husband, to the extent that they focus on the extent to which the husband's
income has been enhanced during the marriage. This focus in some cases stems from the
sustained focus on the cases involving professional degrees.
144. This point and the next respond to Ellman's point that "the marriage has not
continued; why then should [the wife] continue to share in her former husband's income as if
it had?" Ellman, Nonfinancial Losses, supra note 33, at 274. Fathers gain sole physical
custody in less than 10% of divorces; even in states that encourage joint custody, mothers
tend to have physical custody and to have primary responsibility for caretaking. See ELEANOR
MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF
CUSTODY 112, 269 (1992).
145. See Carbone, Family as Community, supra note 31, at 385 n.135.
146. See supra text accompanying note 124. The continuing flow of domestic services
remains invisible only because it never occurs to us that a father should have to marginalize
his market work to minister to children's needs.
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former wives. 147 Indeed, the dominant family ecology continues to affect
mothers even after their children have left home. The effects on the wife's
earning potential remain in the form of the decreased earnings. 148 The
ex-husband, in contrast, experiences no decrease in earnings potential-
and so is still benefitting from the dominant family ecology long after the
marriage has ended. In each case, the relevant comparison should not be
to the husband's situation if he had never had children, but rather to the
husband's situation if he had raised children without a primary-caretaker
wife.
In summary, Ellman's approach at best allows recovery for a limited
number of high-status women, while it leaves a much larger number of
lower-status wives without post-divorce entitlements. In addition, his ap-
proach ignores the continuing benefits conferred upon the husband by the
dominant family ecology even after the marriage has ended. The key
question is whether the law will acknowledge the continuing family ecology
or will ignore it. Traditionally, this question did not arise, because cover-
ture arbitrarily allocated ownership of family assets to the husband. Courts
and legislatures need to ask themselves whether to continue coverture's
allocation or to change it.
1. Income-Equalization Reflects the Continuation of the Dominant
Family Ecology149
My analysis of the dominant family ecology suggests an approach to
post-divorce entitlements very different from Ellman's. Ellman perpetu-
ates the "he who earns it" rule; I consider it a holdover from coverture.
Although the husband clearly owns "his" wage vis-a-vis his employer, this
147. This approach contrasts sharply with the assumption that the husband's obligations
to the wife reflect only the effects of gender roles while the marriage remains intact. See
Starnes, supra note 1, at 125-26 (arguing that divorce does not automatically terminate all
shared enterprise in which spouses have jointly invested); Singer, supra note 1, at 1106-07.
Divorced women earned only 56% of the per capita income of divorced men in 1980 (down
from 62% in 1960). See OKIN, supra note 1, at 161, 207 n.86.
148. See Jacob Mincer & Solomon Polachek, Family Investments in Human Capital: Earn-
ings of Women, in ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 397 (Theodore W. Schultz ed., 1974) (finding
that wives who interrupted their careers lose an average of 1.5% of income for each year
they are out of the work force, with college-educated wives losing as much as 4.3%); see also
Oldham, supra note 29, at 1107, nn.80-82 (citing additional studies). A more recent study
found a typical wage gap of 33% in the first year back to work, with some, but not all, of the
gap being made up over time. See Estin, supra note 2, at 746, n.87 (citing Laura Myers,
Women Who Interrupt Career Fall Into Pay Gap, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA, Jan. 11, 1992, at
1A). To the extent that wives do not stop working, but join the "mommy track," their
earning capacity also decreases. See supra text accompanying note 43.
149. My proposal differs from the nineteenth-century joint property proposal in several
ways. The joint property proposal was put forth when divorce was virtually nonexistent.
Consequently, its focus was on giving wives management control during marriage, and
ownership rights in excess of dower upon the death of their husbands. See Siegel, Home as
Work, supra note 5, at 1113-15, 1120, 1169-77.
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does not necessarily determine the issue of whether he owns it vis-a-vis his
family. My analysis of the dominant family ecology suggests that the wages
of the family should be jointly owned. In this section I will argue that the
way to accomplish this is by equalizing the incomes of the two post-divorce
households.
As noted above, many commentators have endorsed income-sharing
proposals, but few have placed such proposals on a firm theoretical ba-
sis.15 My analysis of the dominant family ecology provides one: income
equalization emerges as a property scheme that better reflects the domi-
nant family ecology than the "he who earns it" rule.
Income-equalization rests on two notions of family entitlement reflected
in the analysis of the dominant family ecology. The first is that, in a system
where market work requires an ideal-worker parent to be supported by a
flow of domestic services from a primary caretaker, the primary caretaker
is entitled to share income with the ideal worker. The second principle is
that children of divorced families are entitled to the same claim on family
wealth that the children of two-parent families have. This would avoid the
problems of the current system, in which divorce leads to permanent
disinvestment in a family's children: numerous studies show that "children
of divorced parents are less likely to equal or surpass their parents' social
,,151and economic status ....
One crucial question is how to split the income between one household
in which the adult is the primary caretaker of the family's children and
another household in which the adult is not. Splitting the post-divorce
income equally between the households fails to consider both the direct
costs of supporting the children and the indirect costs associated with
caretaking in a society that marginalizes caregivers.152 Simply dividing the
total combined incomes of the adults by the number of people in the
family presents a different problem: it ignores the differences between the
entitlements of children and those of adults.153 The alternative, which I
endorse, is to equalize the standards of living of the two post-divorce
households.
154
150. See text accompanying note 127.
151. See Woodhouse, supra note 25, at 268-69 (citing studies).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43, 60, 80-89; cf. Singer, supra note 1, at
1117-18. Singer endorses a 50/50 split because she forwards her income sharing proposal as
a solution to the "theory of alimony" problem; she assumes that child support will continue
to be calculated separately. See id. at 1120 (concluding that during period of equal income
sharing, each spouse would make equal contribution to child support).
153. Jane Rutherford, in a proposal intended to apply only to long-married caretakers,
proposes a split based on the number of people in each household. Rutherford, supra note 2,
at 578; see also Jane Rutherford & Barbara Tishlet, Equalizing the Cost of Divorce Under the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act: Maintenance Awards in Illinois, 23 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 459
(1992).
154. This proposal has gained the support of many other commentators. See OKIN, supra
note 1, at 179, 183; REGAN, supra note 20, at 148; WEITZMAN, supra note 1, at 337-43 (noting
[Vol. 82:22272258
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The next issue is how long income should be equalized. The widespread,
but incorrect, assumption is that incomes must be shared forever if a
property law rubric is adopted. 155 This assumption flows from the implicit
model of the fee simple in land. 156 But, of course, even some "classical"
interests (such as life estates, conditional estates, and tenancies) do not
entail eternal ownership. Moreover, the "disintegration" of property means
that property rights are a malleable bundle of rights defining the legally
recognized interests of persons with respect to some valuable asset:157 the
definition may, but need not, entail permanent rights.
If the concept of property does not require granting a permanent inter-
est, how long should income equalization last? The first step in defining
the desirable period is straightforward. Because the dominant family ecol-
ogy typically continues for the period of the children's dependence, so
should income-equalization. 158 The second (and harder) step is to account
that after divorce, women experience substantial decrease in standard of living while men
experience increase); Goldfarb, supra note 2, at 50-53; O'Connell, supra note 2, at 506
(suggesting that equalizing post-divorce standard of living may be appropriate basis for
division of marital estate); Rhode & Minow, supra note 11, at 201, 203 (contending that in
marriages of long duration spousal support should serve to equalize standard of living after
divorce); Regan, Spouses and Strangers, supra note 33, at 2387.
155. This assumption emerges clearly in the degree cases. See, e.g., Stevens v. Stevens, 492
N.E.2d 131, 134 (Ohio 1986) (stating that to consider degree as property would be unfair to
professional because he would be prevented from ever changing careers); In re Marriage of
Olar, 747 P.2d 676, 680 (Colo. 1987) (holding that degree is not property because it
represents opportunity to make money based on future events too indefinite to calculate);
Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 532 (N.J. 1982) (stating that degree cannot be property
because of potential for inequity to failed professional or one who chooses to change
careers; the finality of property distribution would preclude ever rectifying the unfairness);
DeWitt v. DeWitt, 296 N.W. 2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1980) (holding that degree is not property
because person could not practice or could generate less than average income but still be
compelled to share something that does not exist; as property, division could not be adjusted
to reflect long-term change in circumstances).
156. For discussion about the central role of the fee simple as the default assumption in
American property law, see BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note 5.
157. See Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII 69
(J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
158. I would not limit the period of dependence to the age of majority. For a discussion of
the central role of college in contemporary wealth transmission, see Langbein, supra note
102, at 734-36. For a discussion of the impact of this trend on the children of divorced
parents, see WEITZMAN, supra note 1, at 278-81 (discussing impact of decreasing age of
majority from 21 to 18); Woodhouse, supra note 25, at 269 (noting that children of divorce
are less likely to obtain a college education). My proposal also differs from Okin's, in that
she would equalize "for at least as long as the traditional division of labor in the marriage
did and, in the case of short-term marriages that produced children, until the youngest child
enters first grade and the custodial parent has a real chance of making his or her own living."
See OKIN, supra note 1, at 183. My approach would not be tied to proof of traditional roles;
such proof would introduce too much discretion. Nor would it assume that mothers could
perform as ideal workers once their children reached first grade, both because mothers'
workforce participation still would be affected by the children's need for after-school care,
their illnesses, and other childcare-related circumstances, and because of the long-term
impact of mothers' inability to perform as an ideal worker. Note that my proposal assumes
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for the impact of caregiving on the income potential of the wife after the
children are no longer dependent.
My proposal is to adopt an arbitrary guideline that does not attempt to
calculate the actual period required for the wife to regain her income-
earning potential, but is focused instead on generating solutions in two
situations. The first is where a long-married homemaker is divorced after
her children are grown.159 The second is where a woman is divorced when
her children are young.
Any proposal that limits income equalization to the period of the
children's dependence yields unacceptable results for the long-married
homemaker.'6 ° Take a homemaker married at 24 whose thirty-year mar-
riage ends the year she turns 54 and her last child leaves home. A proposal
that mandated income equalization only for the period of the children's
dependence would deliver her, upon divorce, onto the job market at age 54
with thirty-year-old skills. In this situation, her husband has enjoyed the
full benefits of the dominant family ecology and should share in its impact
on the homemaker's income potential. Moreover, the wife has relied for
thirty years on the expectations of mutual dependence built into the
dominant family ecology during marriage.16' To reflect both facts, I pro-
that mothers will reenter the work force as soon as their caregiving responsibilities allow
them to do so-typically by the time their youngest child reaches first grade, at a minimum-
but it recognizes that their incomes will suffer as a result of both past and on going
caretaking responsibilities.
The question of whether income sharing should continue after remarriage is a complex
one. See Rutherford, supra note 2, at 578. The answer depends in part on the issue of
whether stepparents are made liable for the support of stepchildren. For a thoughtful
discussion, see David Chambers, Stepparents, Biologic Parents, and the Law's Perceptions of
"Family" after Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM, supra note 1, at 102.
159. I refer to caregivers as mothers because the overwhelming number are mothers.
However, the entitlement I propose is triggered by caregiving, not by sex. Thus, caregivers in
same-sex couples would receive it, as would caregivers who are fathers in heterosexual
couples, or who become custodial parents after divorce. The entitlements typically would not
be affected by joint custody arrangements, since studies have found that in most families
where the parents have joint custody, the mother remains the primary caregiver. See
Carbone, supra note 31, at 385 n.135 (stating that when joint custody is awarded, mothers
remain responsible for more than half of childcare). As Professor Estin points out, courts
have long been in the business of figuring out who the primary caregiver is. See Estin, supra
note 2, at 726. To the extent that feminists are apprehensive about granting the entitlement
to custodial fathers, note that the income transfer will be minimal except in cases where the
noncustodial mother is earning a lot more than the custodial father.
160. The assumption that long-married homemakers should be protected is dramatized by
the fact that even courts that have generally been extremely reluctant to grant post-divorce
entitlements to wives have more often granted them to long-married homemakers. See Estin,
supra note 2, at 745 (citing a study by Lenore Weitzman which found, in a survey of judges,
that a longtime homemaker would be more likely to receive a substantial award than a young
woman with young children).
161. As this sentence suggests, I propose income equalization in situation involving
marriage because of the expectations of mutual dependence that marriage brings. The
proposal, to be effective, would have to apply not only to formal, but to de facto marriages:
otherwise fathers could evade income equalization by refusing to marry. Some precedent
v T
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pose adding a second period onto the period of the children's dependence,
equal to one year of income equalization for every two years of marriage,
to begin at the date of divorce.1 62 This calculation would mean that the
longtime homemaker discussed above would be entitled to income equaliza-
tion for fifteen years after the date of divorce, until she was 69.163 This
approach would eliminate the situation where a long-married wife sud-
denly is thrown onto the labor market without a prior chance to plan her
future. Instead, it allows a long-marriage homemaker to use the money
available from income equalization either to retrain (if she is able) or to
save (if she is not)."6 The ex-wife would not by any means be guaranteed
her former standard of living, but her position would be a great improve-
ment over the current situation in which long-married homemakers are
abrubtly reduced to poverty.1
65
In the prototypical case 166 where divorce occurs after four years of
marriage and two young children, income equalization under the proposed
formula would persist for two years after the youngest child ceased to be
dependent. A wife married at twenty-four and divorced at twenty-eight
when her youngest child was one year old would have income-equalization
for the period of the children's dependence plus two additional years. A
two-year period clearly is not enough to remedy the erosion of her earning
potential. But it reflects that she relied only for a short period on the
expectation that the dominant family ecology would provide her with
long-term support.
The shortness of the period reflects the incentives built into this pro-
posal. In the case of the young divorced mother, income equalization
exists for treating de facto marriage the same as legal marriage. See Connell v. Francisco, 20
FAM. L. REP. 1360 (BNA) (1994). The proposal could also be extended to non-marital
situations, on the theory that the obligations incident to child-rearing should be independent
of marriage. I leave it to others to develop this important line of thought, because my goal
here is to define a concrete proposal that courts can adopt with sweeping changes to widely
held assumptions.
162. Jana Singer proposes this rule of thumb "as a starting point," in a somewhat different
context. Her proposal assumes that child support would continue to be calculated separately
from alimony; the two-to-one ratio is proposed as the basis for alimony. Singer, supra note 1,
at 1117.
163. This period might well bring her close to her husband's retirement age, during which
she should be (and often is) entitled to share in is pension. See ELLMAN, supra note 113, at
261-62. A woman who married at age twenty, raised children the youngest of whom ceased
dependence when she was forty, and divorced after twenty years of marriage in the same
year, would receive income sharing until she reached fifty, giving her ten years to save
and/or retrain for self-support. This represents the young end of the "long-married home-
maker" scenario.
164. If the wife has, instead of dropping out of the workforce completely, slowed down
her career, she would have a period in which to regain her lost momentum.
165. Estin, supra note 2, at 741 n.69 (finding that economic disadvantage justifies support
awards for older homemakers).
166. See Carbone, Family As Community, supra note 31, at 383 (recounting Mary Ann
Glendon's description of the prototypical marriage as one that ends after four years and two children).
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typically would end in her forties. The proposal therefore provides a
significant incentive for her to return to the workforce as soon as she feels
she can responsibly do so, given her primary-caregiver role.
167 Equally
important, it gives her former husband a significant incentive to provide
the support she needs to enable her to do market work, because the more
she earns, the less income equalization will affect his income.168 Divorced
mothers typically would be building up their work experience 
16 for much
of the period of the children's dependence, and would have an additional
period (after children's dependence ends) when they could perform as
ideal workers before income equalization ends.
I forward this proposal to encourage discussion of a clearcut formula in
place of the current unacceptable regime. As commentators focus on this
specific proposal, they may discover flaws. Yet the goal should be to
develop a formula that achieves the following goals:
* most importantly, to guarantee that a divorced parent does not have to
choose between her children's economic needs and their needs for
parental care, as she may if she gains custody of her children without
sufficient funds to support them;
* to shield long-married homemakers from being abruptly thrown out
onto the job market in late middle age;
167. Other commentators have pinpointed situations where income equalization might
not work out as proponents expect. See Carbone & Brinig, Rethinking Marriage, supra note 2,
at 103 n.214 (detailing situations where, for couples who do not conform to either the
traditional breadwinner/homemaker model or the more contemporary model of a full-time
worker/part-time worker, application of the partnership model is troubling). Carbone now
appears to embrace income sharing. Carbone, Family as Community, supra note 31, at
405-07. Carbone's hypos discuss what Rutherford has called "the problem of the loafer,"
Rutherford, supra note 2, at 588-89, which occurs when the wife does all, or virtually all, of
both the market and the household work; these situations may also involve domestic
violence. Because my proposal is designed to award property rights to the spouse performing
nonmarket labor in the dominant family ecology, it would not award income sharing to the
"loafer." Another of Carbone's hypos presents a truly egalitarian marriage in which the wife
has elected to give up a high-paying career to pursue a low-paying job, such as being an
artist. My proposal would not apply in the absence of children or a "degree-case" situation.
A third hypo is what Carbone has more recently developed as "the Steven Spielberg case,"
see Carbone, Family as Community, supra note 31, at 25, where the husband is wildly
wealthy. Perhaps the answer, as Carbone herself has suggested, is that husbands in this
situation can protect themselves with prenuptial agreements. Id. at 45. The final hypo is a
"degree case." See infra text accompanying notes 189-268.
168. For example, if he earned $80,000 and she earned $20,000, equalizing the standards
of living of the two households would give 40% of the combined incomes to him and 60% to
her and the children, then income equalization would require him to pay $40,000 ($80,000 +
$20,000 = $100,000 x .4 = $40,000; $80,000 - $40,000 = $40,000). If her salary rose to
$40,000, the amount he owed her would fall to $32,000 ($80,000 + $40,000 = $120,000 x
.4 = $48,000; $80,000 - $48,000 = $32,000).
169. This work experience might be in part-time or mommy track jobs, given the wife's
caregiving responsibilities. See supra text accompanying notes 37-89.
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* to encourage divorced women to rejoin the labor force as soon as their
caregiving allows them to do so, and to give their former husbands an
incentive to provide the child care and other support they need in
order to enhance their market potential.
The risk of offering a specific proposal 17 ° is that it enables others to
generate hypotheticals where it yields undesirable results. Yet the benefits
outweigh those risks, for if future commentators find fault with the model
proposed, a progressive process of redesign can emerge.
The entitlements granted to wives and children pursuant to this income
equalization proposal would be severable only upon divorce."' Since the
entitlements aim to reflect the dominant family ecology, the children's
claim would not be separable from the mother's interest.17
In marriages without children, 73 the sociological patterns are not predict-
able enough to design general entitlements. Yet the dominant family
ecology is in evidence in other cases that, while sociologically unrepresenta-
tive, have nonetheless attracted much attention from courts and commenta-
tors: the so-called degree cases, in which the wife defers her own career to
finance the husband's professional education.174 In this context, the domi-
nant family ecology gives priority to the husband's needs without the
protective covering of "children's needs.
175
170. Some commentators have maintained a tactful silence on this issue. See, e.g., Rhode
& Minow, supra note 2, at 201; Goldfarb, supra note 2, at 50-53; REGAN, FAMILY LAW, supra
note 20, at 138; Regan, Spouses and Strangers, supra note 33, at 2387; O'Connell, supra note
2, at 506. Commentators who are more explicit include OKIN, supra note 1, at 183 (arguing
that income should be shared for length of the marriage or until the youngest child reaches
first grade); Rutherford, supra note 2, at 578 (concluding that income sharing should
continue indefinitely, but limiting her proposal to marriages involving long-term homemak-
ers); Sugarman, supra note 1, at 160 (arguing for a permanent, but very limited interest in
joint income); Singer, supra note 1, at 1117 (proposing one year of income sharing for each
two years of marriage).
171. The interests would somewhat resemble the common law tenancy by the entirety,
which (in typical circumstances) did not give either party the right to partition for the
duration of the marriage. See CURTIS J. BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE 432-34 (3d ed.
1983). Note that the common law tenancy by the entirety gave the right to partition if both
parties acted in concert, a characteristic of the entirety that is different from the property
interest proposed here. Id. at 433.
172. Children's entitlement is an integral part of their right to care from their parents,
and is analogous to the common law duty of support and modern day child support. The
children's joint property right does not give them management control or the right to a
separate, divisible interest in their parents' assets. The children would not, therefore, be
able to claim the right to management and control of the shared income. This reflects
widespread understandings about the relationship of dependent children to a family's property.
173. Sixty percent of divorcing couples have minor children. See Glendon, supra note 1, at
1555 (citing Divorce, Child Custody, and Child Support, in BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: SPECIAL STUDIES 8 (Series P-23, no.84) (1979).
174. For a more extended discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 189-268.
175. Note that the two situations are not really different: when a mother quits or cuts back her
market work because of her "children's needs," she is typically cutting back so that her children can
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Although the degree cases will be discussed in greater detail below,
some general comments are in order here. First, determining whether to
grant a property interest to the wife does not necessarily entail choosing
between either a permanent claim on her husband's income stream or no
claim whatsoever. 176 Once property is viewed as defining relationships
between people with respect to some valuable interest, the entitlement is
properly designed around general sociological patterns, not the default
assumption of a permanent, fee-simple interest. Again, if income equaliza-
tion need not be permanent, how long should it last? A fair approach in
families without children is for the husband to support his wife at his
professional income level for the same period for which she supported him
to attain it. In other words, he should share his professional-level income
with his former wife for the same period that she supported him. This
would allow her to recoup the years she gave up; during the income
equalization period she could retrain or save.
17 7
Implementing the joint property proposal by statute would have two
signal advantages. First, passing new statutes would allow states to avoid
the "divide-and-conquer" problems presented by the traditional separa-
tion of post-divorce entitlements into child support, alimony, and marital
property.1 71 Second, the joint-property proposal would solve the problem
receive the societally accepted level of care without affecting her husband's ability to perform as an ideal
worker (i.e., without responsibility for meeting the children's need for daytime attention).
176. Degree-case courts and commentators often assume that the only alternative to a
permanent claim on the husband's income is nothing at all, or mere restitution of the
amounts of money expended by the wife for tuition, etc. See, e.g., O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66
N.Y.2d at 588 (having decided that degree is marital property, court declared that equitable
distribution of license was appropriate because reimbursement for contribution was not
sufficient); Saint Pierre v. Saint Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250 (S.D. 1984) (refusing to recognize
degree as property because of possible inequity in dividing professional degree but consider-
ing it in awarding reimbursement); Scott E. Willoughby, Note, Professional Licenses as
Marital Property: Responses to Some of O'Brien's Unanswered Questions, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
133 (1987) (discussing methods of evaluating spouses' interest in professional degree:
reimbursement, present value of future increased earnings, and labor theory of value-like
restitution); Marion C. Grimes, Comment, Family Law-New York Rules a Professional
License is Marital Property Subject to Distribution-O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489
N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985), 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1241 (1986) (asserting that
options for distribution include equitable distribution and reimbursement for financial
contributions); Robert C. Shuman, Note, Equitable Distribution of Degrees and Licenses: Two
Theories Toward Compensating Spousal Contribution, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 301 (contrasting
O'Brien, in which equitable distribution of professional license was given, with Lesman v.
Lesman, 442 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1981), in which no value of the degree was given to the spouse.
Shuman suggests that O'Brien and Lesman were not the best solution. For fairness and
accuracy, Shuman argues that restitution should be given based on a calculation of fair
market value of services and contribution.).
177. Note that, in my judgment, wives in this situation cannot expect support from their
former husbands for the rest of their lives. Framing the degree-case issue as one of either
support for the rest of wives' lives or no claim has served only to make the idea of granting
wives' claims implausible.
178. See supra text accompanying note 18.
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of post-divorce impoverishment only to the extent that income can be
reallocated among family members. For many low-income families, no
amount of reallocation will provide adequate resources to the children and
their caretaker. A statutory approach would allow the joint-property pro-
posal to be supplemented by a program that makes additional resources
available to divorcing families, such as Stephen Sugarman's suggestion to
provide such families with funds through the Social Security system.' 79
Finally, a statutory income-sharing scheme could address a related issue:
what to do where income sharing would bring the father's income down
below what he needs to survive-particularly in the AFDC context, where
the funds paid by the father will go not to his children but to the govern-
ment, which is assigned the right to child support payments as partial
reimbursement for AFDC paid to his children. The solution is a self-
support set-aside, such that only income above what is needed to support
the father at an agreed minimal level is made available for income sharing.' 8°
Income equalization could also be implemented by the courts. 181 It
could be used by family court judges in one of two ways. First, courts could
introduce a new category into family law. One lower court took a step in
this direction by recognizing a homemaker's claims through a category it
called "equitable restitution. 18 2 Alternatively, particularly in those states
that mandate or allow courts to take household contributions or caretak-
ers' sacrifice into account in setting alimony,183 courts could implement
179. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Reforming Welfare Through Social Security, 26 U. MICH. J.
L. REF. 1 (1993); see also Rhode & Minow, supra note 11, at 210 (arguing for changes in
divorce law, including improved child care, parental leave, health and pension coverage, job
training, and flexible work scheduling); Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of
Private Responsibility and the Public Interest, in DIVORCE REFORM, supra note 1, at 184-90
(calling for a societal stipend to help pay for raising children).
180. See Aviva Breen, How Child Support Guidelines Address the Special Concerns of Low
Income Families, in CRITICAL ISSUES, CRITICAL CHOICES, SPECIAL TOPICS IN CHILD SUPPORT
GUIDELINES DEVELOPMENT 155 (1987) (describing self-support set-asides); ELLMAN, FAMILY
LAW, supra note 113, at 377 (recognizing one guideline model which does allow for a "self
support reserve" representing the minimum amount required for an adult to meet his or her
own subsistence requirement).
181. The proposal should also be considered by the ALl. The ALI's current proposal,
based on Ellman's approach, is much too narrow. See ALl Principles, supra note 33, §§ 5.06
cmt. a, 50.03(b)-(e), 5.0X (drafters of the ALl principles only envision compensation to
long-term exclusive homemakers and in a narrow range of other cases).
182. See Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69, 78 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 818 P.2d 538
(Utah 1991). The Martinez court's "equitable restitution" is similar to an income sharing
scheme in that it seems to reflect an entitlement, because it does not terminate upon the
wife's remarriage. It is not automatic, however, and does not equalize standards of living. See
id. at 78 (in awarding equitable restitution, courts should consider (1) the length of the
marriage; (2) the financial contributions and personal development sacrifices made by the
requesting spouse; (3) the duration of the contributions and sacrifices during the marriage;
(4) the resulting disparity in earning capacity between the requesting spouse and the spouse
benefitted thereby; and (5) the amount of property accumulated during the marriage).
183. In many states, definitions of maintenance already state that courts may or must
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that portion of the income equalization proposal that concerns sharing
between the husband and wife.
184
Courts could also effect income equalization as a matter of property,
rather than family law. To the extent that courts have adopted the Hohfel-
dian view-encapsulated in the Restatement of Property since 1936185_
that property is simply the set of rules defining entitlements with respect to
some valuable interest, courts are entirely within their rights to overrule
the "he who earns it, owns it" rule and substitute a joint-property regime.
The Hohfeldian view does not require a court to allocate property rights
on an on-off model: modern landlord/tenant law, for example, describes a
complex intermeshing of the rights of landlords and the rights of tenants;
the law of implied covenants and easements similarly balances the rights of
the owner of the burdened estate and the benefitted estate (in the case of
covenants) or the dominant tenement and the servient tenement (in the
case of easements). 8 6 The joint property proposal could be analogized to
these cases, where common law property rules facilitate complex relation-
ships in which neither one of two parties has "absolute" ownership. If
courts were to uphold family claims as a matter of property law, then the
system in which husbands' claims provide the definition of property, while
family claims are allocated to the discretionary realm of family law, would
disappear.
IV. RESPONSE TO SOME POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS
187
The first step in challenging the "he who earns it, owns it" rule is to
acknowledge its existence. The second step is to anticipate various criti-
cisms not already addressed. I begin by addressing the charge that prop-
erty concepts "do not fit"' 188 in the context of post-divorce income. I then
discuss the related concern that the joint property proposal introduces
excessive commodification into family life. Third, I discuss the charge that
the joint property proposal threatens the principle of the "clean break."
consider a spouse's domestic work in setting levels of maintenance. Estin, supra note 2, at
749 nn.99-100. According to Estin, courts have often failed to take caretaking into account in
awarding post-divorce entitlements even where the relevant statutes allow or mandate them
to do so, id at 750-54, in yet another expression of courts' assumption that "he who earns it, owns it."
184. This amount would then be added onto child support.
185. See BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note 5.
186. This argument is more fully developed in BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note 5.
187. For insightful discussions of some other potential objections to the sharing of
post-divorce assets, see Rutherford, supra note 2, at 584-92 (arguing that income-sharing
may prevent clean breaks, strain second marriages, encourage loafing, worsen poverty in
low-income families, and discourage marriages); Carbone, supra note 2, at 407-13 (arguing
that income sharing is ineffective in nonstereotypical families, provides a disincentive to
work, doesn't adjust to income changes, doesn't apply to non-marital births, doesn't allow
for change in agreements, implies a need for change in parental rights issues, brings about
guidelines of fairness, and perpetuates gender roles).
188. Wisner v. Wisner, 631 P.2d 115, 122 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
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Finally, I discuss two different kinds of concerns raised by contemporary
feminists.
A. THE PROFESSIONAL DEGREE CASES AND THE MYTHOLOGY OF
PROPERTY
I will tell you what the value of a law school education is. It is zero.
189
[Tihe chameleon character of the term 'property right' [is such that] it is
not an absolute standard, but a variant which each man, layman, legisla-
tor, and judge, determines individually out of his own background.' 90
Despite some early support19' for using the language of property to
address the issue of post-divorce impoverishment, it is an article of faith
among many family law courts and scholars today that property language is
out of place and inherently unconvincing in this context.1 92 This dismissal
is ironic because, as we have seen, conclusions about ownership are
inevitable; the only question is whether the family wage will continue to be
awarded one-sidely to the husband. The disagreement is not over whether
the family wage will be owned, but over who shall own it.
I will argue that the courts' and commentators' rejection of property
language in this context reflects its linkage with arguments of human
capital theorists. Such arguments generally have failed to persuade courts,
1 9 3
leading many family law scholars to conclude that property rhetoric has
failed them. In fact, property rhetoric is not the problem; human capital
theory is. As Milton C. Regan Jr.'s contribution to this symposium illus-
trates, family law scholars tend to conflate the two.
1 9 4
189. Thomas v. Thomas, 346 N.W.2d 595 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (statement of trial court
judge).
190. Note, The Valuable Quality of a Vested Right, 34 YALE L.J. 303, 309 (1925).
191. See GLENDON, NEW FAMILY/NEW PROPERTY, supra note 27; WEITZMAN, supra note 1,
at 110-42.
192. Mitt Regan's Spouses and Strangers, supra note 33, in this symposium, is only the most
elaborate of many such statements. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 1, at 1116-17 ("[c]ourts are
highly unlikely to expand notions of marital property to encompass assets such as job
seniority and future earnings, which possess few of the traditional attributes of property
[citing degree cases] .... Expanding the definition of marital property... is likely to face
courts and legislatures with insurmountable problems of conceptualization and valuation.");
Rutherford, supra note 2, at 575-77 (concluding it is "more intellectually honest and fairer
simply to admit that spouses expect to share income when they are married" than to expand
the definition of marital property).
193. See Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REv. 383,
433 (1993) (noting that "courts have almost universally rejected" arguments treating hus-
bands' human capital as marital property).
194. See Regan, Spouses and Strangers, supra note 33, at 2335.
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Moreover, courts and commentators rely on property theory more than
half a century out of date. More modern property theory shows the force
of the joint property proposal. What courts have rejected, I will argue, is
the specific entitlement proposed in the degree cases (that is, a permanent
entitlement for the former wife) and the off-putting rhetoric associated
with human capital theory.'95 The joint property theory avoids both, and is
therefore not precluded by the degree-case precedents. 196
The typical degree case involves a wife who supported her husband
through professional school and who claims "property in his degree" when
he divorces her shortly after graduation."' Courts, with few exceptions,
have rejected wives' claims that the degrees are marital property, often
using broad language to the effect that human capital does not have the
attributes traditionally associated with property. To justify this rejection,
courts rely on the traditional Blackstonian image of property rights as the
absolute dominion of people over things.' 98 This imagery, however, was
195. Human capital theory has been aptly criticized by others. See Singer, supra note 33, at
2437-53; Regan, Spouses and Strangers, supra note 33, at 2334-38.
196. The potential role of the degree cases in the context of joint property claims is
illustrated by Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 818 P.2d 538
(Utah 1991). The Martinez court's award was calculated on the basis of enhanced earning
capacity, and thus differed somewhat from the joint property theory presented in this paper.
In Martinez, a wife asserted an ownership interest in the family wage in a situation where she
had borne three children in five years and had been a homemaker for the last fourteen years
of marriage. The husband earned $100,000 as a doctor; the Court of Appeals awarded
"equitable restitution" to the wife, in addition to alimony and child support. Martinez goes
far beyond the "degree cases" in that the wife contributed no funds to her husband's
education, and gave up no career of her own. She was "just a housewife," a position the
Court of Appeals described as providing vital support to her husband. Id. at 75. As the
dissent notes, the Court of Appeals' equitable restitution theory reallocates ownership of the
family wage, and recognizes family claims arising from the family pattern I have called the
dominant family ecology.
The Martinez court encountered the argument that the degree cases foreclosed its equi-
table restitution theory. This argument would no doubt be raised in the context of a joint
property theory as well.
197. Although this is the classic scenario, the cases also cover situations where the
couple's marriage continues after the degree is gained, or where the husband supported the
wife's degree. For an extensive listing of cases, see Deborah A. Batts, Remedy Refocus: In
Search of Equity in "Enhanced Spouse/Other Spouse" Divorces, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751,
799-804 (1988).
198. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2 (property rights entail "that sole and
despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world,
in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe"). Although Blackstone
said that the owner's dominion was so absolute that society would "not authorize the least
violation of it; no not even for the general good of the whole community," 1 BLACKSTONE,
supra, at *135, the rights he described were far from absolute. See FORREST MCDONALD,
Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 13 (1985)
("Blackstone's sweeping definition of the right of property overstated the case; indeed, he
devoted the succeeding 518 pages of book 2 of his Commentaries ... to qualify[ing] and
specify[ing] the exceptions to his definition."). I nonetheless observe the convention of
referring to the absolutist conception of property as Blackstonian. Commentators, as well as
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never an accurate description of property law, and was formally aban-
doned in the First Restatement of Property in 1936.99 The 1936 Restate-
ment adopted instead Wesley Hohfeld's view that property rights defined
the relationships among people with respect to some valuable interest. The
image is not of "absolute" ownership but of an evolving set of claims, in
which courts attach the name "property" as a signal they have accepted
someone's claim. 2 ' From a Hohfeldian perspective, the joint property
proposal emerges as a redefinition of family relationships, away from
coverture's hierarchical allocation of ownership exclusively to the husband,
to reflect the more egalitarian expectations of the modern era.
The degree cases project a very different image of property rights.2 °1
The most famous statement is from the much-quoted case of Graham v.
Graham:
20 2
An educational degree, such as an M.B.A., is simply not encompassed
even by the broad views of the concept of 'property.' It does not have an
exchange value or any objective value on an open market. It is personal
to the holder. It terminates on death of the holder and is not inheritable.
It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed or pledged. An ad-
vanced degree is a cumulative product of many years of previous educa-
tion, combined with diligence and hard work. It may not be acquired by
the mere expenditure of money. It is simply an intellectual achievement
that may potentially assist in the future acquisition of property. In our
view, it has none of the attributes of property in the usual sense of that
term.
203
Other courts have used the same reasoning: "Since a professional license
does not have the attributes of property, it cannot be deemed 'property' in
the classical sense," said one court after quoting the passage from Gra-
courts, often assume the Blackstonian image. See, e.g., Theory of Alimony, supra note 2, at 69
("One approach that attracted considerable attention redesigned the husband's professional
degree or license as 'property' which could then be 'divided' upon divorce. The very oddity
of the idea made it fashionable for a while .....
199. See BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note 5.
200. See generally Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The
Development of the Modem Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 363 (1980) (arguing
that public policy choices, rather than value to the individual, create the notion of property).
201. So does Regan, see Spouses and Strangers, supra note 33, at 2339. Regan acknowledges
that this image represents the "mythology" rather than the actuality of property, yet he
treats it as real nonetheless.
202. In re Graham, 574 P.2d 75 (Colo. 1978) (en banc). According to one commentator,
the "property does not fit" argument is the most common argument in degree cases. See Eric
Julian Mayer, Comment, For Richer or Poorer-Equities in the Career-Threshold, No-Asset
Divorce, 58 TUL. L. REV. 791 nn.12-13 (1984).
203. Graham, 574 P.2d at 76.
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ham.2 °4 It concluded "that an advanced degree, such as a medical license,
is not 'property' under our Divorce Code.
20 5
Note the form of the argument. The court starts out with a pre-defined
notion of what "property" entails.20 6 It then inquires whether a degree
"fits" that image. Upon deciding that it does not, it concludes that no
property right exists in the wife.20 7 In sharp contrast to the Hohfeldian
view that property reflects evolving relationships between people, this
old-fashioned formalistic style of legal thought carries the message that
judges' conclusions about property flow nigh-automatically from the cat-
egory "property., 2 8 In contrast to the Hohfeldian view's message that
''property" is a word courts use to signal their legal conclusion that
someone has an entitlement, the Graham court's language sends the
message that judges play no active role in determining entitlements. But
they do. Conclusions about property are legal conclusions, made in a
context where the court has to allocate the asset to someone.
Courts' eagerness to disguise their role in allocating entitlements has led
to a metaphysical style decried by the legal realists as "transcendental
nonsense." 20 9 In 1980, a Wisconsin court concluded that, if a wife were to
win, she "will have been awarded a share of something which never existed
,,211in any real sense. What never existed? Conclusions about property
rights are conclusions about entitlements, not observations of some pre-
existing reality. One court asserted: "The medical license may be used and
enjoyed by the licensee as a means of earning a livelihood, but it is not
204. See Hodge v. Hodge, 520 A.2d 15, 16 (Pa. 1986).
205. Id. at 17. According to one court, virtually all the degree cases include some version
of this argument. Archer v. Archer, 493 A.2d 1074, 1076 (Md. 1985).
206. Note the court's reliance on a "classical" notion of property despite the fact that
some state statutes, see, e.g., O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 713 (N.Y. 1985) (discussing
New York statute), and the Uniform Marital Property Act, UNIF. MARITAL PROP. ACT, 9A
U.L.A. 97 (1983), incorporate expansive views of property more in line with contemporary
property theory.
207. Courts that refuse to grant wives a "property right" often allow limited recovery in
other ways. These range from allocating those assets recognized as marital property in a way
that takes into account the wife's contributions, or taking those contributions into account in
setting alimony, or allowing wives to recover money spent for tuition or other expenses on a
restitution theory. Sterk, supra note 193, at 434-35.
208. For a description and critique of this type of legal thought, see Felix Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 820-821
(1935); Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The
Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1990, 3 RES. IN L. & Soc. 3 (1980) (defining
classical legal thought); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of Law, 73 CAL L. REV. 1151, 1155-56
(1985). For other examples, see Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1080 (Utah 1988) ("An
educational degree, such as an M.B.A., is simply not encompassed even by the broad views
of the concept of "property."); Hodge v. Hodge, 520 A.2d 15, 17 (Pa. Super. 1986) ("Since a
professional license does not have the attributes of property, it cannot be deemed 'property'
in the classical sense.").
209. See Cohen, supra note 208, at 820.
210. DeWitt v. DeWitt, 296 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
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community property because it cannot be the subject of joint owner-
ship., 21 Degrees are not joint property because they cannot be the subject
of joint ownership? 212 The courts' circular statement blurs its role allocat-
ing entitlements between husband and wife.
In addition to circular and metaphysical arguments, courts mobilize the
absolutist imagery that Professor Regan aptly calls the "mythology of
property, ' '2 13 which projects market imagery of property rights as absolute,
alienable, inheritable, and exchangeable on the open market. 214 This abso-
lutist image of property sounds eminently plausible 215 when the Graham
court reasons that a degree is not property because it cannot be sold or
inherited and has no value on the open market. Yet many property rights
exhibit none of these characteristics. Life estates are not inheritable, nor
are fees tail inheritable in the usual sense.216 Inalienable interests include
the interest of a life tenant with an inalienable life estate and that of a
beneficiary of a spendthrift trust.217 These examples illustrate that even
some "classical" estates do not fit the court's absolutist model.
Many modern property rights also clash with a model of absolute,
alienable, inheritable, and exchangeable entitlements. Examples are pen-
sions and goodwill which are widely recognized as property despite their
lack of heritability218 and their status as income streams provided by
211. Muckelroy v. Muckelroy, 498 P.2d 1357, 1358 (1972) (quoted in Petersen v. Petersen,
737 P.2d 237, 240 (1987)); see also In re Aufmuth, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668, 667-78 (Cal. Ct. App.
1979) (degree is not marital property because it is not susceptible to joint ownership); Todd
v. Todd, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 135 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (same); Muckelroy v. Muckelroy, 498
P.2d 1357, 1358 (N.M. 1972) (same).
212. Some courts sweep away these metaphysical arguments with the impatience they
deserve. See, e.g., Woodworth v. Woodworth, 337 N.W.2d 332, 335 (Mich. App. 1983)("Yet
whether or not an advanced degree can physically or metaphysically be defined as 'property'
is beside the point. Courts must instead focus on the most equitable solution to dissolving
the marriage and dividing among the respective parties what they have."). For another
circular argument, see Ann E. Weiss, Note, Property Distribution in Domestic Relations Law:
A Proposal for Excluding Educational Degrees and Professional Licenses from the Marital
Estate, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1327, 1332 (1983).
213. See Regan, Spouses and Strangers, supra note 33, at 2339.
214. See In re Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 76-77 (Colo. 1978) (en banc).
215. So plausible, in fact, that even courts that uphold family claims tend to concede that
the degree does not fit the image of property, and have based their decisions on a desire to
achieve an "equitable result." See, e.g., In Re Weinstein, 470 N.E.2d 551, 557 (I11. App. Ct.
1984).
216. One cannot devise a fee tail to one's legal heirs: it typically passes automatically to
the "heirs of one's body." See BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note 5.
217. This argument is from Shuman, supra note 176, at 313 n.57, an excellent student note
on degree cases that makes sophisticated use of contemporary property theory.
218. See Mayer, supra note 202, at n.122-25. To support its holding, the Graham court
cites to an earlier Colorado decision however, Ellis v. Ellis, 552 P.2d 506 (1976), holding that
goodwill is not property. Other courts have cited Graham's discussion of property even when
pensions and/or goodwill are recognized as property in their states. See Helen A. Boyer,
Note, Equitable Interest in Enhanced Earning Capacity: The Treatment of a Professional Degree
at Dissolution-In Re Marriage Washburn, 60 WASH. L. REV. 431, 433 (1984).
HeinOnline -- 82 Geo. L.J. 2271 1993-1994
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
"many years of... hard work." Inalienable property rights include stock in
closely held corporations, partnership interests, rights in cooperatives, and
pension rights. Moreover, in some contexts courts recognize property
rights in jobs.219 The question, then, is why they refuse to do so in the
context of post-divorce entitlements. Courts' refusal to recognize "new
property" rights in the context of the family stems not from the logic of
property, but from unstated assumptions about who is entitled to what.
Courts also commonly point to the "intangibility" of the proposed
interest as a reason why professional degrees are not considered property.
In the words of one such court, degree cases involve "an intangible
property right, the value of which, because of its character, cannot have a
monetary value placed upon it for division between spouses., 220 Yet
property rights exist in many intangibles; indeed, the "dephysicalization"
of property rights is a key element in the shift in Anglo-American legal
thought that occurred between the late eighteenth century and the early
twentieth century. 221 Today, many valuable, intangible interests are consid-
ered property, including pensions, goodwill, trademarks, and trade secrets.
If courts' projected image of property rights is so inaccurate and their
property theory half a century out of date, why have the degree cases
proved so convincing? I have argued in a different context that contempo-
rary property law combines absolutist rhetoric, or the "mythology of prop-
erty," with an actual practice of property law that reflects a more Hohfeldian
view.222 In cases in which courts refuse to redistribute the bundle of sticks
between a landowner and the public or another landowner, they often
mobilize the mythology of property as a justification.223 In sharp contrast,
if courts decide to grant such a request, they ignore the mythology of
219. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344-46 (1976) (stating that a property interest
in employment can be created by ordinance or contract). For a more detailed discussion, see
Boyer, supra note 218, at 441-45.
220. See Todd v. Todd, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 135 (1969); Washburn v. Washburn, 677 P.2d
152, 162 (1984) (Roselini, J. dissenting) (comparing degree asset to goodwill property
interest). But cf. Hodge v. Hodge, 520 A.2d 15, 24-25 (Pa. 1986) (Larsen, J. dissenting)
(distinguishing between a professional degree that is not property and the tangible proceeds
generated by a degree that are property).
221. See Vandevelde, supra note 200, at 341-54.
222. See generally BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note 5; Joan C. Williams, The Rhetoric of
Property (Aug. 20, 1994) (unpublished manuscript on file with author.)
223. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899-902 (1992)
(state statute forbidding permaiient habitable structures on beachfront land constitutes
"appropriation" of land and "imposes a servitude" that constitutes a taking only if it
prohibits more than common law principles would have prevented). Characterizing the
regulation as imposing a servitude builds in the assumption of some set of "natural"
components of the bundle of sticks; any change to the bundle is conceptualized as an
appropriation. Note that the Lucas majority explicitly relies on "the understandings of our
citizens regarding the content of, and the State's power over, the 'bundle of rights' that they
acquire when they obtain title to property." Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2899. But cf. Grey, supra note
157, at 69 (noting that lay people greatly exaggerate the absoluteness of contemporary
property rights). See Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, supra note 222, at 55 (draft).
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property altogether and offer substantive reasons for their reallocation of
entitlements.224 Similarly, in degree cases, courts use the mythology of
property to insist that they could never disturb coverture's allocation of
ownership to the husband; were they committed to reallocating the bundle
of sticks, the mythology of property would fade into the background.
Thus, courts' use of the mythology of property in degree cases tells us
less about their authority to reallocate the bundle of sticks than it does
about their desire to do so. We must therefore examine why courts are so
reluctant to accept wives' claims of entitlement.225 As the economists tell
us, the first place to look in discerning human motivation is self-interest. In
the degree cases there is plenty at work, for they strike painfully close to
home.226
224. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470, 493-502
(1987) (giving policy reasons for holding that 27 million tons of coal were not appropriated
without mentioning the absoluteness of property rights).
225. As I have argued in another context, Americans' insistence on deciding issues
concerning the allocation of family entitlements within the context of divorce cases sets up a
"war of the sexes" atmosphere that ultimately works against women's interests. See Joan C.
Williams, Privatization as a Gender Issue, in A FOURTH WAY 215, 223-27 (Gregory S.
Alexander & Grazyna Skapska eds., 1994). From the viewpoint of an outsider, for example,
the sharp division by gender among family law scholars is somewhat shocking, with female
scholars scrambling to justify entitlements for women; see, e.g., Fineman, supra note 1, at 49;
Rhode & Minow, supra note 11, at 199-209; WEITZMAN, supra note 1, at 379; Glendon, Fixed
Rules, supra note 29, at 1183-85; Rutherford, supra note 2, at 577-84; Singer, supra note 1, at
1114; Younger, supra note 29, at 906, while male scholars either argue for sharply limited
entitlements or for a shift of responsibility from husbands to the state, see, e.g., Krause,
supra note 179, at 177-90; Parkman, supra note 33, at 131-37; Schneider, supra note 2, at 221;
Sugarman, supra note 1, at 148-165; Theory of Alimony, supra note 2, at 5. An exception to
the pattern is Mitt Regan, see Spouses and Strangers, supra note 33, at 2395. Note that some
female family law scholars also argue for an increased state role. See, e.g., Rhode & Minow,
supra note 11, at 210. The reaction of law students to degree cases is harder to predict on the
basis of discussing degree cases showed that some men supported the wives' claims, see
Daniel E. Burke, Comment, 'Till Graduation Do We Part-The Professional Degree Acquired
During Marriage as Marital Property Upon Dissolution: An Evaluation and Recommendation for
Ohio, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 227 (1987); Corey Coleman, Note, Alimony v. Marital Asset:
Michigan's Response to the Degree Dilemma Postema v. Postema, 9 COOLEY L. REV. 531
(1992); and Shuman, supra note 176, at 301; while some women opposed their claims, see
Weiss, supra note 212 and Joan Freedman Mayer, Note, Family Law-Reimbursement Ali-
mony-In a marriage of Relatively Short Duration Where One Spouse's Contributions Enable the
Other to Attain a Professional Degree and There Are Few Tangible Assets to Distribute, a Court
May Consider "Reimbursement Alimony," Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527
(1982), 14 RUTGERS L.J. 1011 (1983).
226. The degree cases involve a small, unrepresentative sample of cases heavily loaded
against family claims. As of March 1993, only 11.4% of the population in the U.S. had
professional degrees (i.e., law, medical, veterinary). 7.4% of the population had degrees
beyond a bachelors (with majority being masters) as of the same date. BUREAU OF CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (1993). For a discussion of the
class bias involved in awarding family claims only for professional degrees, see Lesli F. Burns
& Gregg A. Grauer, Human Capital as Marital Property, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 499, 537-40
(1990). It is also unrepresentative: because the couples involved often have deferred child-
birth, the degree cases decide the issue of ownership without reference to the key processes
by which wives' market participation is marginalized. The degree cases encourage courts to
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Family court judges, almost by definition, are successful lawyers. Most
are men 227 who have conformed to an ideal worker pattern in a profession
notorious for long hours.228 This workaholic culture tends to marginalize
the ideal workers' wives, 229 as they assume more and more family responsi-
bilities to allow for their husbands' "success." It is also the (upper-middle)
class context in which the ideology of gender equality is strongest.23° In
short, the judges in degree cases are heavily invested in the polite fiction-
observed in most intact marriages-that the husband's career success and
the wife's marginalization both result not from a system that privileges
ideal workers who can command a flow of domestic services from women,
but from the idiosyncracies of two individuals residing in the republic of
choice.231
The degree cases also reflect judges' sense that they worked long and
232hard for their degrees. Their reaction is colored by their struggles in law
school and their sense that they have earned everything they have achieved
through their own hard work. That degree holders worked long and hard is
not the issue. So did their wives, both in the home and (often) at boring,
dead-end jobs, passing up opportunities for better positions.233 The issue is
not who worked hard, but whose hard work gives rise to entitlements. 234 If
forget the impact on children of allocating the family wage one-sidedly to the parent who is
not the children's caregiver. The typical degree case context also divorces the allocation of
human capital from a systematic description of the family ecology. This encourages courts to
attribute the results of the dominant family ecology to individual "choice." See, e.g., Duspiva
v. Duspiva, 581 N.Y.S.2d 376, 377 (1992) (wife "chose" not to work outside the home while
the husband attended college); supra text accompanying notes 62-64. Thus, the adage that
"all adults have to live with the results of their choices" glosses over the fact that the
"choices" at issue occur within the context of powerful social forces that act upon men and
women.
227. See Murphy, supra note 30, at 219 n.49 (stating that as of 1988, 92.6% of federal
judges and as of 1986, 92.8% of state judges were male).
228. See Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 38, at 1619.
229. Benenson, supra note 52, at 28 (wives of high-income husbands less likely to work
outside the home than wives of lower-income husbands).
230. See Hochschild, supra note 54, at 189-93; RUBIN, supra note 47, at 96-98.
231. See Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 38, at 1562-72, 1596-1608. The relatively few
female judges may be high-human-capital women who may not be sympathetic to the claims
of mothers marginalized by motherhood. Id. at 1597-98, 1605-06.
232. See, e.g., In re Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo. 1978) (en banc) ("An advanced degree
is a cumulative product of many years of previous education, combined with diligence and
hard work.").
233. For example, in O'Brien v. O'Brien, the wife worked several jobs simultaneously and
passed up an opportunity to get a teaching certificate that would have qualified her for a
higher salary. 66 N.Y.2d 576, 581 (Ct. App. 1985).
234. The argument made here may be contrasted with the argument that family claims
should be recognized to achieve an equitable result. See, e.g., Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d
266, 268 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) ("[Tlhere are certain instances in which treating a professional
license as marital property is the only way in which a court can achieve an equitable
result."). This formulation leaves husbands' claim in the realm of entitlement, and family
claims in the discretionary realm of equity, and therefore reproduces rather than solves the
problems underlying the current system. For an open assertion of the assumption covertly
2274
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courts hold that only men's hard work gives rise to entitlements, they need
to give reasons for that decision.235
If we examine the reasons courts have given for their decisions, we find
that rejection of wives' claims has been closely tied to the rationale and the
design of the proposed entitlement. Wives' lawyers, using human capital
theory, defined an entitlement equal to the present value of the difference
between what the husband would have earned without the degree, and his
projected earnings with the degree. 236 This proposed entitlement had two
basic drawbacks.237 First, it was framed in language of investment, which
made the entitlement sound implausible and seemed to create unhealthy
commodification of intimate relations. Second, it defined the proposed
entitlement in a way that courts found overly burdensome on the husband.
I will discuss each point in turn.
The proponents of human capital theory rely on commercial analogies
that seem jarring and out of place when applied to family relations. Joan
Krauskopf, in an early application of the human capital theory to post-
divorce entitlements, characterized the family as "a firm seeking to maxi-
mize its total welfare," and projected the image of a wife seeking "a fair
return on her investment. 238 Ira Ellman, whose approach is also based on
human capital theory, pursues a long analogy of the wife to a company that
supplies specialized parts to IBM, and argues that both the wife and the
part supplier make "investments a self-interested bargainer would make
only in return for a long-term commitment., 239 Ellman explains in another
context that "[i]f [the wife] invests in herself and does poorly, she has no
reflected in the degree cases, see Hoak v. Hoak, 370 S.E.2d 473, 477 (W.Va. 1988) ("On the whole, a
degree of any kind results primarily from the efforts of the student who earns it. Financial and
emotional support are important, as are homemaker services, but they bear no logical relation to
the value of the resulting degree."). The court's approach reflects not "logic," but value choices
regarding whose economic efforts should be rewarded with entitlements.
235. Courts sometimes argue that both parties made sacrifices in order to allow the
husband to attain his degree. See, e.g., Hodge v. Hodge, 520 A.2d 15, 17 (Pa. 1986)
("However, we must not forget that others, including the student-spouse, have made
sacrifices to aid him in achieving his advanced degree and increased earned income. Thus, it
is inherently unfair to compensate one spouse, to the exclusion of all other contributing
persons, for the achievements of the other spouse."). I could not agree more. That is why I
oppose the current regime, which turns the husband's sacrifices into an economic entitle-
ment, without doing the same to those of the wife. For an example of a court that recognized
the sacrifices of both spouses and turned both into entitlements, see Woodworth v. Wood-
worth, 337 N.W.2d 332, 333-34 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). The relevant law in Michigan is
complex and contradictory. Compare Woodworth and Lewis v. Lewis, 448 N.W.2d 735, 738-39
(Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (degree considered a marital asset) with Krause v. Krause, 441
N.W.2d 66, 69-72 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (value of degree irrelevant because degree is not
property or marital asset).
236. See Boyer, supra note 218, at 455-57.
237. An additional drawback from the viewpoint of the wife was that it requires complex
calculations that necessitate expensive expert testimony that many wives can not afford. See
Burns & Grauer, supra note 227, at 515.
238. See Krauskopf, supra note 1, at 380.
239. Ellman, Theory of Alimony, supra note 2, at 42.
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one else to cover her loss. There is no reason why someone else should
cover it if she invests in her husband instead and he does poorly." '24 The
wife cannot complain, says Ellman elsewhere, any more than someone who
invested in the wrong building.241 Yet she is entitled to compensation if
she "depletes her capital assets" 24 2 through a "financially rational" deci-
sion.243 In one of the most recent expositions of human capital theory,
Cynthia Starnes speaks of the "income-generating marital enterprise ' '2 1 in
which "a dissociated spouse should receive a buyout of her investment.,
245
Human capital theorists' highly commercialized language weakens wives'
claims both by reinforcing the sense that they were flailing around for
inherently unconvincing rationales, and by sending the message that grant-
ing wives an entitlement threatens undesirable commodification of inti-
mate relations.246 Courts made both points early and often. A 1980
Wisconsin court asserted that awarding a claim to the wife "treats the
parties as though they were strictly business partners, one of whom has
made a calculated investment in the commodity of the other's professional
training, expecting a dollar for dollar return. We do not think that most
marital planning is so coldly undertaken. 247 A 1988 West Virginia court
noted "[m]arriage is not a business arrangement, and this Court would be
loathe to promote any more tallying of respective debits and credits than
already occurs in the average household., 24 ' Another West Virginia court
added that "characterizing spousal contributions as an investment in each
other as human assets demeans the concept of marriage. 249 Courts' own
anxiety about commodification is echoed by commentators' criticisms. One
noted that "[d]ivorce does not represent a commercial investment loss.
' 25°
Another added that "analogizing marital educational financing to investing
in a commercial enterprise ignores the personal basis behind the institu-
tion of marriage by reducing the marital relationship to an arm's length
commercial transaction.,
251
240. Id. at 67.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 44.
243. Id. at 58.
244. See Starnes, supra note 1, at 125.
245. Id. at 124.
246. For protests, see Schneider, supra note 2, at 241-42; Robert J. Levy, A Reminiscence
About the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act-and Some Reflections About Its Critics and Its
Policies, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 64-65.
247. DeWitt v. DeWitt, 296 N.W.2d 761, 767 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980); see also Archer v.
Archer, 493 A.2d 1074, 1077 (Md. 1985) (stating that characterizing spousal contributions as
investment or commercial enterprise "demean[s] the concept of marriage" (citations omit-
ted)).
248. Hoak v. Hoak, 370 S.E.2d 473, 478 (W.Va. 1988).
249. Id. at 476. For other cases that use this argument, see Archer, 493 A.2d at 1077.
250. See Weiss, supra note 212, at 1345-46 nn.131-36.
251. See id. at n.57.
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Human capital theory's commercialized language violates the "common
sense" structured to draw an impenetrable boundary between the realms
of family and market.252 This violation leads to a sense of dissonance I
have called commodification anxiety, 253 which expresses fears of a world in
which all human relations assume a market model of commercialized
self-seeking. The role of commodification anxiety in policing traditional
gender boundaries will be examined below; 254 for now, the crucial point is
that human capital theory's focus on wives' "return on investment" implies
that the only alternative to a one-sided allocation of the family wage to the
husband is the specter of a family life corroded by strategic behavior. The
commercial analogies of human capital theory seem to prove that any
solution, other than the traditional one of allocating all ownership in the
husband, will threaten the intimacy of family life. 25
Courts' negative response to human capital theory reflects not only
commodification anxiety, but also their rejection of the relief wives typi-
cally demand in degree cases: to be given a percentage of the amount by
which a degree enhanced the earning power of the husband. Even though
courts perform the same computation in wrongful death and other tort
cases, degree-case courts commonly reject this calculation, which requires
a projection of the husbands' earning power, as "too speculative,, 256 and
as "a gamut of calculations that reduces to little more than guesswork." '257
So the question is why courts are willing to engage in such calculations in
some contexts, but are reluctant to do so when a wife is claiming an
interest in her former husband's degree.258
One rationale courts commonly give is that awarding the proposed
entitlement would unduly impinge on husbands' freedom.2 59 The most
252. See Clifford Geertz, Common Sense As A Cultural System, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE:
FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 84 (1983) ("Common sense is not what
the mind cleared of spontaneously apprehends; it is what the mind filled with suppositives
... concludes.") See generally Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of
Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
253. See BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note 5.
254. See infra text accompanying notes 280-81.
255. The joint property proposal tries to avoid commodification anxiety by eschewing commercial-
ized rhetoric, and instead, mobilizing metaphors of sharing that are more in tune with marital ideals.
256. See Willoughby, supra note 176, at 139 n.32.
257. Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 531 (N.J. 1982). This objection rings hollow
given that this is precisely the kind of calculation courts commonly make in wrongful death
and other torts cases. See, e.g., Washburn v. Washburn, 677 P.2d 152, 162-63 (Wash. 1984);
William A. Callison, Comment, Professional Licenses and Marital Dissolution in O'Brien v.
O'Brien: Expectation Returns in the Marital Partnership, 72 IOWA L. REV. 445, 459 (1987). For
an argument that valuation of degree assets is no more speculative than the valuations
involved in unvested interests in pension plans, see DeWitt v. DeWitt, 296 N.W.2d 761,
770-71 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (Pykman, J., concurring).
258. Other commentators have pointed out that defining wives' shares on a percentage
basis would eliminate the concerns expressed by the courts even under the human capital
theory. See Callison, supra note 257, at 459-62.
259. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 532 (N.J. 1982); In Re Olar, 747 P.2d
22771994]
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vivid protest is from a court that argued that an award to the wife "would
transmute the bonds of marriage into the bonds of involuntary servitude
contrary to Amendment XIII of the United States Constitution. 26 ° An-
other court referred to the potential to "subject[] the husband to a life of
professional servitude.", 26' The same court continued: "In reality, however,
after a divorce a person may choose not to practice his or her chosen
profession, may later change to a less lucrative specialty, or may fail in the
chosen profession. Such developments cannot be anticipated at the time of
divorce.,
262
This language requires some unpacking. The underlying point made by
these courts is that, given the widespread rule forbidding modifications of
marital property divisions, a holding that a degree is marital property
would forbid courts from making any adjustment if a husband did not in
fact earn the income a court projected he would earn.2 63 The expressed
fear is that a husband's job choice would be limited by his need to earn the
income a court projected for him. Underlying this expressed fear, I sus-
pect, is a reaction against "making the husband a lifetime provider," even
though a marriage is over.2 6
My argument is that courts' rejection of wives' claims in the degree
cases-however much the courts' language relies on mere logical deduction
from the category "property"-in fact rests on their rejection of the
rhetoric and the substance of the specific entitlement proposed by human
capital theory. If this is so, the degree cases do not bind future courts
considering the joint property proposal because the two differ in substan-
tial ways. First, the proposed joint property entitlement does not engage in
''speculative" calculations in order to give wives a permanent "ownership
interest" that limit husbands' future freedom, 265 since if a husband takes a
676, 678-79 (Colo. 1987); DeWitt, 296 N.W.2d at 767-68; Stevens v. Stevens, 492 N.E.2d 131,
133 (Ohio 1986); Severs v. Severs, 426 So.2d 992, 994 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). Courts
sometime say that their refusal to engage in "speculative" calculations forces them to limit
wives' claims to restitution for tuition and other amounts paid by the wife. This argument is
particularly hollow given the fact that framing wives' awards as a percentage of the hus-
band's income stream would solve the problem of speculativeness. See Callison, supra note
257, at 461-62. For a solution similar to my proposed solution, see Boyer, supra note 218, at
456-59.
260. Severs, 426 So.2d at 994.
261. See Stevens, 492 N.E.2d at 133.
262. Id. at 133-34; see also DeWitt, 296 N.W.2d at 767; Hoak v. Hoak, 370 S.E. 2d 473, 476
(W.Va. 1988); In re Olar, 747 P.2d 676, 678 (Colo. 1987).
263. See ELLMAN, FAMILY LAW, supra note 113, at 451 (citing Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act § 316) (stating that "property division is not modifiable"); see also id. at 330-31
(arguing that allowing professional degree to be considered property would result in abandon-
ing general rule of unmodifiable property judgments).
264. See Sugarman, supra note 1, at 152.
265. The exception would be in very long-term marriages, particularly those involving
couples with children. For example, if a wife was divorced at age 50 after thirty years of
marriage, using Singer's ratio she would share income with her husband for fifteen years,
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lower-paying job, the amount of income to be equalized will fall automati-
cally.266 Second, the joint property proposal is not based on the commer-
cial metaphors at work in the degree cases. Instead, it is based on
widespread notions of marital sharing framed within the context of the
dominant family ecology; so the joint property proposal, unlike the degree
cases, avoids the off-putting market language that seems to commodify
intimate relations. These differences between human capital theory and
the joint property proposal point back to property theory. The Hohfeldian
view-that courts use the label "property" when they wish to find an
entitlement and refuse the label when they want to deny rights-shows
that courts' refusal to grant wives the entitlement requested in the degree
cases does not constrict them in the future from granting the very different
entitlement delineated by the joint property proposal. Once the issue of
post-divorce impoverishment is seen as an issue of property law-indeed, as
the issue of whether a framework carried over from coverture will be
perpetuated-courts may act without the unnecessary baggage of human
capital theory.267
B. GENDER AND COMMODIFICATION
The joint property proposal institutionalizes sharing and protects the
altruism necessary to sustain family life.268 It is based upon the view that
the only alternative to sharing ownership of the family wage is to allocate
ownership one-sidedly to the husband. Nonetheless, it may well awaken
fears of excessive commodification, despite its avoidance of commercial-
ized language.
The basic argument would run as follows: Of course the husband's
economic efforts give rise to an entitlement-who else but the worker
would own his wage? Similarly, "common sense 269 suggests that a wife's
hard work should not give rise to economic entitlements. Mothering and
domestic work naturally are noncommodified: to start commodifying within
the family would corrode the spontaneous sharing and genuine intimacy
necessary for healthy family life.
until age 65 (whereupon, she would presumably receive a share of her former husband's
pension). Note, as always, that the closer the wife's income is to the husband's, the less
impact income sharing will have on the husband. Thus, the income transfer will typically be
least where the couple has relatively egalitarian roles, and will become greater the more
marginalized the wife has become.
266. This statement assumes good faith actors.
267. Human capital theory has been aptly criticized by others. See Singer, Alimony and
Efficiency, supra note 33, at 2437; Regan, Spouses and Strangers, supra note 33, at 2334-38.
268. See Rutherford, supra note 2, at 550-51; Estin, supra note 2, at 721; see also Susan
Westerberg Prager, Sharing Principles and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25 UCLA L.
REV. 1 (1977); Beverly Horsburgh, Rdefining the Family: Recognizing the Altruistic Caretaker
and the Importance of Relational Needs, 25 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 423 (1992).
269. Geertz, supra note 252, at 75 (stating that the tenets of common-sense "are immedi-
ate deliverances of experience, not deliberated reflections upon it").
1994] 2279
HeinOnline -- 82 Geo. L.J. 2279 1993-1994
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
This objection fails for two reasons. First, this argument runs together
two distinct issues: a wage-earner who "owns" his wage in relation to his
employer does not necessarily own that wage in relation to his family.
Second, note the dichotomies implicit in the basic argument: work
(naturally commodified) versus family (noncommodified); instrumental
behavior versus spontaneity, genuineness, and intimacy. These dichoto-
mies suggest why limiting ownership to the wife awakens commodification
anxiety, while allocating ownership to the husband does not. The dichoto-
mies reflect a pattern of argumentation that accompanied a shift in gender
arrangements in the half-century after 1780. Before that date, neither
productive nor reproductive work was commodified in most families. Both
took place around the house, and both parents were involved in productive
as well as reproductive work.270 After 1780, these patterns began to change.
The shift from agricultural to market labor drew men out of the house and
into the time-disciplined environment of the factory. The ideology of
"separate spheres" emerged, associating men with commodified market
activities, and women with the noncommodified sphere of "home sweet
home., 27' The insistent noncommodification of the domestic sphere may
well have reflected an uneasiness with commodification in the male sphere:
one historian has argued that "women's self-renunciation was called upon
to remedy men's self-alienation.
' 272
This history provides the background for the commodification anxiety
awakened by the joint property proposal. Note how the issue of ownership
within the family is transmuted into a question of whether or not owner-
ship is appropriate at all in this context. Note, also, that ownership is
inevitable: allocating ownership one-sidedly to the husband does not in-
volve any less "coldness" than does splitting it between the two households
resulting from divorce. Yet this point is glossed over: instead, the issue is
framed in terms of a contrast between men's "naturally commodified"
work in the market and women's "naturally noncommodified" work in the
household. After this dichotomy is established, "common sense" takes
over to police the traditional boundary between the altruistic and sharing
behavior in the family and the self-seeking behavior in the market.273
Human capital theory's commercialized metaphors play into this dy-
namic by reinforcing the message that any change to the current system of
allocating property rights one-sidedly to the husband will necessarily sully
family life with self-seeking behavior. This fear persists even in the absence
of commercial metaphors, because the entire issue of allocating family
270. See Williams, Married Women, supra note 98, at 387-88.
271. NANCY F. CoTr, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: "WOMAN'S SPHERE" IN NEW EN-
GLAND, 1780-1835 66-71 (1977).
272. Id. at 71.
273. See Olsen, supra note 252, at 1521.
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entitlements brings us face-to-face with the fact that marriage is simulta-
neously an intimate arrangement and an economic one.
Earlier generations recognized marriage as both an economic arrange-
ment and a locus of intimacy, with little sense of contradiction. 74 The
more modern insistence that intimate relationships involve no strategic
behavior is highly unrealistic. In fact, the boundaries between the market
and the family are porous. In intact families, sociological studies have
found that husbands' market power translates into power within the house-
hold.275 Other studies show that husbands' ability to exit the marriage
while retaining the key family asset greatly enhances their bargaining
power within the marriage.276
The idea of a wall separating market from nonmarket transactions is
comforting.277 But if the goal is to contain the alienating effects of the
market, a far more effective strategy is to identify both the nonmarket
elements of market transactions and the economic elements of marriage
and other nonmarket relationships. This strategy also avoids a key impact
of the wall separating market from nonmarket domains: a reinforcement
of traditional gender relations. The wall divides economic entitlements
based on gender, because men's economic entitlements "naturally" will
end up commodified whereas women's "naturally" will not. The alterna-
tive strategy, which posits a continuum of market and nonmarket elements
across a broad range of human interactions, holds greater promise both for
gaining recognition for the nonmarket elements of a broad range of
market transactions, as well as for destabilizing the sense that domestic
work "naturally" fails to provide entitlements.
Intimate relations are affected by the market; commodified relations
include elements more commonly associated with the realm of family and
intimacy. Academics provides a good example. Academic work is tied up
with personal identity; it has substantial emotive content, and academics
often build affective relationships around work. Yet few academics com-
plain that being paid for their work sullies their ability to do it well. The
274. See Carol Weisbrod, The Way We Live Now: A Discussion of Contracts and Domes-
tic Arrangements, Paper Given at the Harvard Law School Faculty Workshop, Dec. 17, 1993.
275. See, e.g., OKIN, supra note 1, at 158; Rosen, supra note 71, at 101; Glenna Spitze,
Women's Employment and Family Relations: A Review, 50 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 595, 601-03
(1988) (employed wives wield more power relative to their husbands, at least in decisions
about money); PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES 53-56 (1983)(in
all types of couples except lesbian couples the amount of money a partner earns, in
comparison with a partner's income, establishes relative power); Dair Gillespie, Who Has the
Power? The Marital Struggle, 33 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 445 (1971) (finding that the greater the
husband's income and status, the greater his decision-making power in the family); Phyllis N.
Hallenbeck, An Analysis of Power Dynamics in Marriage, 28 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 200 (1966).
276. See OKIN, supra note 1, at 167-68.
277. Margaret J. Radin, Justice and the Market Domain, in NOMOS XXXI, MARKETS AND
JUSTICE (John W. Chapman & J. Roland Penncock eds., 1989) (discussing the metaphor of
the wall).
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issue of whether work gives rise to an economic entitlement is separate
from the issue of whether work-in the academy or in the household-
structures personal identity and provides the framework for relationships
with substantial emotive content.
278
Once we acknowledge the nonmarket aspects of market transactions
and the role of the market in intimate behavior, family relations can be
seen as giving rise to economic entitlements without awakening the fear
that all intimacy and caring will be replaced by instrumental behavior. This
analysis offers a new perspective on the relationship of commodification
and gender. The strong anticommodification impetus behind the existing
literature 279 has tended to blind commentators to the role of commodifica-
tion anxiety in policing traditional gender roles. Commodification may be
troubling in many contexts, but in others a refusal to commodify is equally
troubling. The commodification debate must evolve away from a reflexive
anticommodification posture, to an understanding of the way commodifica-
tion anxiety polices traditional gendered allocations and maintains the
dichotomy between the market and the family.
280
C. THE "CLEAN BREAK"
Another predictable objection to the joint property proposal is that it
runs counter to a strong trend in modern divorce law-the philosophy of
the "clean break., 281 Traditional2  marriage was forever; the notion of
permanent alimony expressed this view. One thrust of the no-fault revolu-
tion was to reverse this traditional assumption and to substitute the view
that divorce was simply the unfortunate breakdown of a love relationship;
once the marriage was dead, both parties should be free to put it behind
them and move on.
The problem with the "clean break" theory is that a mother who has
marginalized her career in order to allow her husband to perform as an
ideal worker cannot simply put the marriage behind her. The impact of the
marriage is embedded in her eroded career potential: one study found that
278. Carol Rose makes a similar argument. See generally Rose, supra note 36 (cooperative
behavior occurs in the market as well as the home; strategic behavior occurs in both areas as
well).
279. See Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56, 64
(1993) (expressing concern about the "effect of human flourishing by conceiving of every-
thing that people value in market rhetoric").
280. See Olsen, supra note 252, at 1501-05. See also Siegel, Marital Status Law, supra note
5, at 77-81. The similarity is striking between the degree-case courts' anti-commodification
language and that of the nineteenth-century marital service cases Reva Siegel has unearthed.
281. The clean break philosophy of the no-fault revolution is discussed in REGAN, supra
note 20, at 39; Glendon, Family Law Reform, supra note 1, at 1557.
282. Note how this means traditional Protestant marriage. See Weisbrod, supra note 274,
at 51 n.135 (stating that observations of "traditional" marriage are based on Anglo-
American law).
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women lose 1.5 percent of earning capacity for each year out of the labor
force.283 In addition, the father in a family with the dominant family
ecology does not want a "clean break" either. What he wants (and gener-
ally gets) is the ability to take with him the career benefits that he received
as a result of the division of labor within the marriage.284 The "clean
break" imagery is a way to characterize rules that allow the husband to
walk away with this income transfer from his former wife as if those rules
maximize the freedom for both parties.
This is not to minimize the extent to which the "clean break" feels like
an apt description to the husband. Keep in mind the close association of
maleness with "success., 285 A man who is deprived of the benefits of "his"
success because of his commitments to a prior family would not have the
freedom men now enjoy to seek emotional and sexual fulfillment on the
secondary marriage market. This freedom is alluring; taking it away no
doubt feels like a threat.286 The predominant self-understanding of men in
this position seems to be: "She hurt me; I hurt her. Now we both need to
put it behind us and move on.",287 With the initial characterization I do not
take issue: most divorces hurt. Nor do I take issue with the need to move
on. The issue that must still be settled is who will move on with what.
Today a man can overinvest in his career with the secure social knowl-
edge that if his marriage fails, he can walk away with his wallet and enter
the secondary marriage market largely unimpaired.28 8 He can put the
marriage behind him in a way that his marginalized wife cannot. This is the
freedom I am proposing to constrict, both in the interest of treating both
spouses fairly, and to encourage investment in existing marriages and
existing children.
Thus far, I have observed the convention of bracketing the children
(except to the extent that the wife's dependence is a pass-through of
theirs). Yet, as other commentators have noted,289 this bracketing is a
283. See Beninger & Smith, supra note 2, at 207. Wives with college education can
decrease their lifetime earnings by as high as 4.3% per year. Id.
284. Accord Starnes, supra note 1, at n.278.
285. See text accompanying notes 47-48.
286. I base this statement on the intense reaction precipitated when I have presented the
ideas contained in this paper to various audiences. In each context one or more (self-
described) divorced men reacted with a fervor that once threatened to produce a walk-out by
the other women present.
287. For a judicial expression of this position, see Lesman v. Lesman, 88 A.D. 2d 153, 159
(N.Y. App. Div. 1982) ("Every unsuccessful marriage results in the disappointment of
expectations, financial as well as non-financial, but it does not result in a financial loss in a
commercial sense.").
288. In the words of one court in an alimony case, "As to deterring remarriage, we can
only say that to the extent the rule makes people realize that they may not pursue their own
pleasures in utter disregard of an earlier marriage of 22 years that has produced four
children and a dependent spouse, it is to be commended rather than faulted." In Re Ramer,
231 Cal. Rptr. 647, 652 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
289. See FINEMAN, supra note 1, at 11, and sources cited at supra text accompanying note 29.
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convention that needs to be reassessed. The husband owns his wage in
relation not only to his former wife, but also to his own children;290 they,
too, are excluded from ownership and allocated resources only on the basis
of "need." This decision to preserve fathers' freedom to seek future
emotional and sexual fulfillment at the expense of their children is indefen-
sible. It can be dispensed with in a sentence: mothers always have under-
stood that having children decreases future freedom. 291 Fathers need to
learn the same lesson. Mothers' obligations to their children have long
been seen as permanent, while fathers' obligations are limited by their felt
entitlement to remarry.29 2 Mothers never have had the option of disinvest-
ing in existing children in favor of having new ones; offering this option to
fathers ought to seem equally bizarre.
The underlying message of the joint property proposal is that, once a
wife has marginalized for her husband, and/or children are born, the
mutual interdependence of marriage is a long-term arrangement. This
message fits well with new thinking that sees divorce less as a complete
rupture than as a rearrangement of family relationships. 293 Again, this new
view aptly captures the experience of the marginalized mother, who contin-
ues to live with the consequences of her marriage even after it has ended.
The joint property proposal simply requires that her former husband share
that experience.294
D. RESPONSE TO FAMILY LAW COMMENTATORS
In this section I respond to some potential objections that might be
raised by various family law commentators. I first address the proposal
from the standpoint of commentators whose attention is focused on nontra-
290. See supra text accompanying notes 24-29.
291. See CAROL SANGER, SEPARATING FROM CHILDREN (forthcoming 1995). My proposal
is similar to others that propose to place the needs of children over the right of the
noncustodial parent. See Glendon, Family Law, supra note 1, at 1558-60; WEITZMAN, supra
note 1, at 266-67; Rutherford, supra note 2, at 585-88. But see Oldham, supra note 29, at 1125
("Many, myself included, would find it unfair to burden unduly the noncustodial parent's
ability to remarry."). It depends, of course, on what one means by "unduly," but I suspect
my definition would diverge from Sugarman's. The argument that a father's right to remarry
should not be burdened by obligations incurred at divorce is, in essence, an argument that a
father should have the right to choose to ignore the needs of his existing children because of
his desire to have new ones. This argument is bizarre: do mothers have the right to ignore
the needs of existing children because they want to start a new relationship and have new
ones?
292. Sugarman, supra note 1, at 148 (holding that divorce law should not discourage
remarriage).
293. My approach is consistent with Professor Regan's suggestion of conceptualizing
post-divorce entitlements within a framework of continuing spousal responsibilities. See
Regan, Spouses and Strangers, supra note 33, at 2395; see also REGAN, supra note 20, at
143-48.
294. See Rutherford, supra note 2, at 585 (suggesting that the lack of a clean break is, in
fact, a benefit, because it increases the likelihood that fathers will remain involved with their
children).
[Vol. 82:22272284
HeinOnline -- 82 Geo. L.J. 2284 1993-1994
Is COVERTURE DEAD?
ditional households. I then consider the potential objections of "sameness
feminists." Third, I address likely objections from a male perspective.
Finally, I respond to the concerns raised by Twila Perry from the stand-
point of critical race theory.
A number of commentators have argued that family law proposals need
to take into account not only traditional families but also nontraditional
ones.295 The joint property proposal is designed to help not only women in
heterosexual couples, but also single mothers. Its ultimate aim is to give
post-divorce custodial families, which are almost exclusively mother-
headed, an ownership claim on family assets. Moreover, it is designed to
help any person who performs the gender role traditionally allocated to
females, regardless of the person's sex. Thus, it would provide a claim to a
male in a gay couple who played the gender role typically assigned to
mothers in heterosexual couples.
A second group that might raise objections are feminists who are appre-
hensive about granting divorced wives alimony or other on-going claims for
fear of encouraging women to succumb to the gender pressures towards
dependency. 296 A typical example is Herma Hill Kay's 1987 discussion of
when alimony should be available to marginalized women. Kay felt per-
fectly comfortable with the notion of alimony for older homemakers,
whose decisions were made when society offered few alternatives. In
contrast, she expressed reservations about whether such alimony should be
available for younger women.
... I do not believe that we should encourage future couples entering
marriage to make choices that will be economically disabling for women,
thereby perpetuating their traditional financial dependence upon men. 9 7
Kay herself has now backed off this argument,298 yet it reemerges in the
work of younger feminists.2 99
This argument troubles feminists who feel it abandons real women hurt
by the gendered realities of their lives, in the hopes of building a better
future for women whose life patterns sameness feminists find more conge-
nial.3°° My description of the dominant family ecology adds a dimension to
295. See supra text accompanying note 90.
296. For more detailed descriptions of the sameness position, see Carbone & Brinig,
Rethinking Marriage, supra note 2, at 974-75; Christine Littleton, Equality and Feminist Legal
Theory, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 1043, 1058-59 (1987).
297. Kay, Equality and Difference, supra note 1, at 80; see also Stark, supra note 21, at 1179.
298. See Herma Hill Kay, Beyond No-Fault: New Directions in Divorce Reform, in DIVORCE
REFORM, supra note 1, at 6, 32-34.
299. See, e.g., Stark, supra note 21, at 1179; Perry, supra note 8, at 2506-07; see also
Oldham, supra note 29, at 1102-03 (asserting that divorce law should encourage a woman to
remain in the workforce rather than become financially dependent upon her ex-husband).
300. For a general critique of sameness feminism, see Catherine MacKinnon, Difference
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this response to sameness feminism. Note the emphasis in sameness femi-
nism on "choice." My analysis of the dominant family ecology shows that
married women's "choices" flow from a gender system deeply embedded
in the dominant family ecology and the structure of market work. This
gender system sets up powerful dynamics that individual women often are
ill-equipped to defeat. The rhetoric of choice, and a refusal to rescue the
victims of the dominant family ecology, send exactly the wrong message:
that individual women bear the responsibility to defeat the gender system-
and that if they do not, the economic marginalization that results will be
labeled their "choice.,
30 1
A more effective way of discouraging traditional gender roles is to
change the powerful dynamics that pressure wives to become dependent.
The joint property proposal does this in two ways. First, it raises the costs
of traditional gender roles for men, so that men, like women, suffer
long-term adverse consequences for family patterns that involve wifely
dependence. Income-equalization after marriage provides an incentive to
both former spouses to arrange their lives so that wives can return to
market work as soon as their caretaking allows them to do so. Former
husbands' incentive is that, the more the wife earns, the less the impact of
income-equalization of his income. Former wives' incentive is that, in most
cases, income-sharing will end a short time after the children's depen-
dence ends, leaving the woman to support herself on her own.3 °2
The joint property proposal is designed to reflect the gender system we
now have: to protect mothers from "choices" that reflect a gender system
rather than true choice. But it also moves society towards the goal of
reconstructing wage labor, by eroding the key benefit currently offered to
and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, & On Exceptionality: Women as Women in Law, in
CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32-45,
70-77 (1987). For a specific criticism of Kay's proposal, see Carbone & Brinig, Rethinking
Marriage, supra note 2, at 992-96. Kay herself appears in recent work to be more receptive to
alimony. See Kay, supra note 298, at 32-34 (adopting, with modifications, Ellman's ap-
proach); Herma Hill Kay, Toward A Theory of Fair Distribution, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 755,
762-63 (1991). For a critique of Kay's embrace of Ellman's "Theory," see Jane W. Ellis,
Surveying the Terrain: A Review Essay of Divorce Reform at the Crossroads (book review), 44
STAN. L. REV. 471, 474-75 (1992). I discuss Kay's 1987 article despite her more recent
provisos because apprehensions about dependence continue to haunt thoughtful feminists.
See, e.g., Stark, supra note 21, at 1179 ("Accordingly, fairness requires that this division of
labor be taken into account when dividing the property at the time of divorce. I propose that
there be a presumption in favor of a greater division of property to the woman when the
parties have divided their labor in the home in accordance with gender stereotypes. I will
argue that fairness further requires that such favorable treatment stop short of perpetuating
dependence, or any other continuing relationship between the parties inconsistent with the
autonomy of each."); id. at 1206-10; Perry, supra note 8, at 2507. Note that in most
marriages, no method of dividing the tangible assets will be of much help to most women
involved in divorces, as Stark recognizes, id. at 1212-14; Oldham, supra note 29, at 1102-03.
301. For a discussion of how choice rhetoric is used against women in the context of
divorce, see O'Connell, supra note 2, at 500.
302. See text accompanying notes 164-67.
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men: their ownership of the family wage. Eroding the gender system's
benefits to men is a far more palatable first step than the sameness
feminists' proposal to begin a challenge to traditional gender patterns by
eliminating the meager compensatory benefits currently offered to women.
Other potential objections to the joint property proposal are suggested
by prior rounds of the "theory of alimony" debate. Stephen Sugarman has
raised a number of objections from a male perspective. °3 In degree cases,
he argues, the wife conferred no real benefit on the husband because "he
would often have gone to medical school anyway" and financed his pur-
chase through a loan from his bank instead of his wife. In the case of the
mother-at-home, she sacrificed for her children, "but that is different from
saying that her sacrifice was the cause of his career development.""3 4
The degree-case argument needs little comment. Suffice it to say that, if
the medical student had received a loan from the bank, he would be
expected to pay it back, with interest such that he ended up paying roughly
three times the size of the original loan.3"5 Instead, he received a loan
from the wife, who expected to be repaid by accessing human capital
through her man rather than her job, or by being supported at a later point
while she built up her own human capital. Even if her expectations of a
permanent claim on her husband's income cannot be realized, she should
be repaid by sharing her husband's professional income for the same
period for which she shared hers with him.
Sugarman's mother-at-home hypothetical reflects the dominant formula-
tion in the society at large: that mothers stay home for the benefit of the
children, not their husbands. My description of the dominant family ecol-
ogy3. 6 shows that the mother in fact stayed home so the children would
receive the societally accepted level of care while the husband's ability to
perform as an ideal worker remained unimpaired.
Another objection made by Sugarman is that ex-husbands should be
held accountable only for the disadvantages the wife suffered from her
marriage, not for the disadvantages she suffers because of general societal
discrimination. This argument often focuses on the hypothetical where the
wife earns a low salary doing "women's work" (say $20,000 as a librarian)
303. I discuss two of Sugarman's scenarios. The third "corporate wife" scenario describes
a wife who "rather than working on her own career, gives dinner parties and otherwise
socializes with his business friends while her husband pursues his career." Sugarman, supra
note 1, at 157. His text leaves unclear whether Sugarman himself believes that this phenom-
enon is an important part of the problem. I suspect he, like myself, does not. Certainly in
these cases the presence of children is a key determinant; if there were no children of the
marriage, the wife today would probably be working.
304. Id.
305. A medical student with a $90,000 debt would repay a total of $260,698 for a 30-year
loan at 9% interest. The student would repay a total of $136,810 if the same loan was repaid
within ten years. See LAW ACCESS, INC., FEDERAL CONSOLIDATION LOANS (1994).
306. See supra text accompanying notes 37-89.
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and a husband earns a much higher salary doing traditionally male work
(say $80,000 as a businessman). If the husband were forced to share his
income, the argument goes, he would be recompensing the wife for the
general societal discrimination against women workers,3 °7 which should be
borne by society as a whole rather than by him alone. "Even though men
as a class have partly caused women's condition in the job market, I do not
see why the particular man, who now happens to be a former husband,
should be responsible for redressing this much larger societal problem.,
3 8
This argument suggests an impermeable barrier between the family and
the market. Both feminist and economic analysis show that none exists.
Feminist work shows that men's greater power in the workplace leads to
greater power within the family. 309 Economic theory restates this in the
language of rational choice, arguing that a couple composed of a wife who
earns $20,000 and a husband who earns $80,000 will choose to have the
wife make any career sacrifices that are required as a way of maximizing
their overall economic position.310 All these data dramatize the extent to
which the benefits husbands receive as men translate into benefits they
receive in a particular marriage.
Another possible objection from a male point of view is that income-
equalization would penalize the husband in a situation where he wants to
continue the marriage, but his wife is determined to leave because she has
fallen in love someone else. Why should a man in this situation share his
income with his ex-wife? The answer is he need not unless children were
born of the marriage. In a society that chooses to deliver caregiving by
marginalizing the caregivers, fathers need to share their income not only
with their children but also with their children's caregiver; otherwise the
children will suffer. Note that, in the hypothetical case, the caregiver
mother still is delivering to the father the flow of services that allows him
to perform as an ideal worker while having his children under parental
care. The jilted father should not be legally enabled to take out his fury at
his former wife by depriving his children of needed resources. This is not
to minimize the outrage of the ex-husband. The source of this fury,
however, is a society that tips the balance in favor of the freedom of
self-expression rather than in favor of preserving existing marriages. We
may, as a society, want to rethink this balance, by making divorce more
difficult where one party wants to divorce and the other doesn't. This is a
complex topic that cannot be fully developed here.311 For now, the impor-
307. Sugarman, supra note 1, at 152.
308. Id.
309. See supra text accompanying note 276. Carol Rose makes the same point. See Rose,
supra note 36, at 2413 (noting that the boundary between the market and the family is
"porous".)
310. See, e.g., Fuchs, supra note 84, at 71 ("The stronger the individual's situation outside
marriage, the stronger his or her bargaining position within marriage.").
311. An initial reaction is that this proposal would have to be treated with care. For
[Vol. 82:22272288
HeinOnline -- 82 Geo. L.J. 2288 1993-1994
Is COVERTURE DEAD?
tant point is that the children of a marriage should not have to suffer
financially in order to protect their father from the sometimes infuriating
consequences of a society that values amatory freedom so much more than
marital stability.
As a final note, I want to respond to Twila Perry's thoughtful analysis of
the alimony debate from the standpoint of critical race theory. Whether or
not a divorced woman will be helped by income equalization depends on
whether her former husband has enough income that redistribution with
the family will help the household of the ex-wife. Poor women will not be
helped by post-divorce entitlements against their former husbands, but the
large bulk of nonpoor women will.3 12 Yet this is a considerable accomplish-
ment: feminists need not create solidarity among women by delivering
them all, instead of some, into relative (or absolute) poverty.313
Perry's focus on poor women is an important one: any proposal needs to
address the issues she raises. At a minimum, any proposal should be
designed so that it does not hurt the large number of poor, disproportion-
ately African-American women it does not help. This means that an
income-equalization approach should not be implemented without a self-
support set-aside. If it were, the result might be to put even more low-
income black males into prison3"4 (for nonsupport)-which is the last thing
the African-American community, or, indeed, the European-American
community, needs at this point in our history.
Perry's most basic and important point is that a "theory of alimony
should be constructed as part of a broader consideration of the question of
the relationship between women and work." '315 This I have tried to do.
Note, first, that the joint property proposal is not simply another "theory
of alimony;" instead, it attempts to redefine entitlements between the two
post-divorce households in a way that subsumes child support and alimony
into a single calculation of post-divorce income. In closing, I note that the
joint property proposal is proposed as part of a systematic restructuring of
work and family life. In other work, I have proposed restructuring wage
labor so the caregiving does not marginalize the caregiver, and so that the
norm of a responsible worker-is reconstructed to allow all workers,
example, it would not be desirable for an abusive husband to be able to block his wife from
divorcing him.
312. Fourteen and one-half percent of the American population lives below the poverty
line. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P60-185, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS A-8 (1992).
313. See WEITZMAN, supra note 1, at 337-43 (1985).
314. One-fourth of African American males between the ages of 20-29 are in prison, jail,
on probation, or on parole on any given day. See Marc Mauer, YOUNG BLACK WOMEN AND
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A GROWING NATIONAL PROBLEM (REPORT OF THE SENTENC-
ING PROJECT, FEB. 1990).
315. Perry, supra note 8, at 2507.
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My goal has been to argue for a shift in paradigm. The problem of
women's impoverishment upon divorce-to the extent that it can be de-
fined as a problem of private ordering-should not be defined as the need
for a new rationale for alimony. This conceptualization leaves in place too
many of the assumptions that disadvantage women, notably the allocation
of men's claims to the nondiscretionary realm of property, while women's
claims are allocated to the discretionary realm of family law.
Instead, I have argued, the impoverishment of divorced women and
their children is produced by the underlying allocation of entitlements,
notably the "he who earns it, owns it" rule that locates ownership of the
family wage in the husband. A problem created by the underlying alloca-
tion of entitlements should be solved by their reallocation.
My description of the existing family ecology is meant to show that the
property of the family is produced by the simultaneous efforts of the ideal
worker husband and the marginalized worker wife. Without a flow of
domestic services from the wife, the husband could not meet the ideal of a
worker with geographical mobility, no daytime childcare responsibilities,
and few other domestic responsibilities.317 Property produced jointly should
be owned in common, not allocated one-sidedly to the husband.
316. See Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 38, at 49-50.
317. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
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